

JPRS-TAC-91-008  
8 APRIL 1991



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# ***JPRS Report***

# **Arms Control**

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# Arms Control

JPRS-TAC-91-008

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**Commentary Views Results of Baker March Trip to Moscow**

*OW2203050791 Beijing Domestic Service in Mandarin  
0530 GMT 21 Mar 91*

[He Lishan commentary from the "International News and Current Affairs" program: "A Look at U.S.-Soviet Relations Against the Backdrop of Baker's Visit to Moscow"]

[Excerpts] During his visit to Moscow from 14-16 March, U.S. Secretary of State Baker held talks with the president and the foreign minister of the Soviet Union, respectively. Baker's visit to Moscow marked the first formal contacts between high-ranking leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union since the end of Gulf war.

He made this visit at a time when discrepancies between the two countries are increasing because of the Gulf war, the arms reduction talks have reached a stalemate, the Soviet Union is readjusting its domestic policy, and, in particular, the Soviet Union is taking steps to stop separatist activities in the three Baltic republics, which, in turn, has caused a cooling in U.S.-Soviet relations. His trip, therefore, draws international attention. [passage omitted]

The problem of arms reduction talks was the most difficult mission for Baker during this trip. Both sides acknowledged that they encountered difficulties regarding arms reduction. Before Baker's trip, the United States repeatedly accused the Soviet Union of cheating in carrying out the European Conventional Arms Reduction Treaty by moving a large amount of military equipment to the area east of the Ural Mountains and reorganizing three mechanized army divisions as marine corps to avoid reduction. Before the meetings, Baker openly said that he will not submit the treaty to

the Congress for approval before settlement of this problem on the part of Soviet Union. As a matter of fact, the United States has already put aside this treaty. Recently, President Bush said that only when the Soviet Union completely carries out the conventional arms reduction agreement in Europe will negotiations on the reduction of strategic weapons be possible. As far as the problem of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty is concerned, although both sides repeatedly said this treaty is almost ready, the final stage technical problems turned out to be very difficult to handle. According to Soviet officials, the solution to this problem is in the hands of the United States, which lacks political resolution. But Baker said that it takes two sides to show their real resolution in overcoming discrepancies. The stalemate in the negotiations, according to analysis in some reports, is attributable more to political reasons than technical problems.

The Soviet Union wished to discuss a concrete schedule for a U.S.-Soviet summit meeting during Baker's visit; however, after his talks with Gorbachev, Baker said the U.S.-Soviet summit meeting is suspended pending the final drawing-up of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. The United States links conventional arms reduction in Europe with strategic arms reduction and the convening of the U.S.-Soviet summit meeting. Therefore, the problem of whether or not it is possible to break the stalemate in conventional arms reduction in Europe has become a crucial test for U.S.-Soviet relations. [passage omitted]

Few achievements were realized during Baker's trip to Moscow; however, since U.S.-Soviet relations involve strategic security interests of the two countries, both sides said they will seek honest cooperation in a careful and responsible manner. No one is sure that both sides are able to overcome difficulties in the near future. But one thing is sure, that is, the future development of U.S.-Soviet relations will not be a smooth ride.

## JAPAN

### **Soviets Deploy More Backfire Bombers in Far East**

*OW2303110591 Tokyo KYODO in English 0840 GMT 23 Mar 91*

[Text] Tokyo, March 23 (KYODO)—The number of Soviet TU-22M Backfire bombers deployed in the Soviet Far East has increased to over 100 from some 85 during the past year, Defense Agency sources said Saturday.

They said the agency obtained this figure from Western military sources.

Other Japanese military sources said the Soviet Union has been redeploying its forces from west of the Urals to the Far East because of progress in European conventional arms reduction talks.

Last year, the Defense Agency said in a white paper that about 85 Backfire bombers were based east of Lake Baikal and in the coastal region facing the Soviet far eastern island of Sakhalin.

Backfire bombers have a combat radius of about 4,000 kilometers and are capable of carrying AS-4 air-to-ground or ship missiles.

The Soviets have some 360 Backfire bombers and produce another 30 or so every year, the sources said.

The Soviet Union first deployed the bombers in the Far East in 1979, and their number had been stable at around 85 since 1985, they said.

The sources called the increased deployment of backfires a threat to the country and said Japan needs ships equipped with the Aegis Command and Weapons Control System, as well as Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft.

## NORTH KOREA

### **'Chemical Warfare' Preparations in South Viewed**

*SK2203055691 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0503 GMT 22 Mar 91*

["Sinister Intention of Aggressor"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, March 22 (KCNA)—NODONG SINMUN today comments on the sinister intention of

the U.S. imperialists to step up the preparations for chemical warfare in South Korea.

THE WASHINGTON POST said that a U.S. military intelligence service reportedly included South Korea in the list of countries and regions "capable of offensive chemical warfare" in its annual report to the lower house of Congress some days ago, though the Commerce Department excluded South Korea from the list. This means that raw materials and equipment for chemical weapons can freely be sold to South Korea, the newspaper added.

The news analyst says:

It is as clear as noonday which is true and which is false in the report of THE WASHINGTON POST.

It is an open secret that besides the deployment of more than 1,000 pieces of nuclear weapons in South Korea, the U.S. imperialists have built about ten toxic gas plants and produced chemical weapons in South Korea for another war against the North.

This being the fact, why did the U.S. Commerce Department drop South Korea from the list of the countries and regions "capable of offensive chemical warfare"?

This was intended to step up preparations for chemical warfare against the North by continuing to introduce raw materials and equipment for chemical weapons into South Korea in secrecy in face of protests and condemnation from the Korean people and the world's people.

As is already known, the U.S. imperialists have drawn up the operation plan to use nuclear and chemical weapons in case they unleash a new war against the North.

It must never go unnoticed that the U.S. imperialists revealed their intention to freely ship raw materials and equipment for chemical weapons into South Korea at a time when they openly oppose the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula and plan to bring a larger amount of up-to-date weapons and equipment into South Korea.

The U.S. imperialists must refrain from introducing new mass destruction weapons and equipment into South Korea, stop all war games and pull their troops, nuclear weapons and other mass destruction weapons out of South Korea.

## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

### General Updates Soviet Withdrawal Status

LD2503223791 Prague CTK in English 1731 GMT  
25 Mar 91

[Text] Prague, March 25 (CTK)—More than 64,000 of a total of 73,500 Soviet troops had been withdrawn from Czechoslovakia by early today. Major-General Svetozer Nadovic, the chief of the Federal Defence Ministry Administration for the Withdrawal of Soviet Troops from Czechoslovakia, said today.

He told a press conference at Kvetna, East Bohemia, that more than 34,000 Soviet civilians, i.e. 87.6 per cent, had left. The last Soviet tank will leave the Czechoslovak territory on March 27 and the rest of armoured vehicles will be withdrawn on April 2, 1991, Nadovic said.

He stated that property and financial issues linked with the 22-year stay of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia are to be settled now.

Members of the parliamentary commission in charge of the Soviet withdrawal today inspected the biggest ammunition depot of the Soviet troops central group with the capacity of 120,000 tonnes near Kvetna which is already empty.

Commander of the Soviet troops Central Group deployed in Czechoslovakia General Eduard Vorobyev said that all ammunition, including nuclear, has been removed not only from Kvetna but from other places in Czechoslovakia as well. He confirmed that chemical weapons have never been stored on the Czechoslovak territory. The last transport of material from Kvetna will take place on April 8, 1991.

## HUNGARY

### Premier, Soviet Officials Discuss Troop Withdrawal

LD1403045591 Budapest MTI in English 2043 GMT  
13 Mar 91

[Text] Budapest, March 13 (MTI)—According to a communique forwarded to MTI by the prime minister's press office, Prime Minister Jozsef Antall received Soviet Ambassador Ivan Aboimov and Lieutenant General Viktor Shilov the Soviet Government commissioner in charge of troops withdrawal affairs, in Budapest on Tuesday.

Speaking about the financial aspects of the Soviet troops withdrawal from Hungary, Antall said he thought it necessary for mutually acceptable means to be devised for the valuation of buildings and the estimation of environmental damage.

An expert committee headed by government commissioners will draw up the plans and coordinate the proposals.

## POLAND

### USSR's Moiseyev on Troop Withdrawal Talks

AU1703161491 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish  
13 Mar 91 p 2

[Interview with General Mikhail Moiseyev, chief of the Soviet Armed Forces General Staff, by Jerzy Markowski; place and date not given: "Soviet Force To Move Out Starting April"]

[Text] [Markowski] What comments would you make about the talks that you have just held and how would you assess them?

[Moiseyev] I would like to stress very clearly that yesterday's talks with Foreign Minister Skubiszewski provided a basis for pursuing very substantive and detailed talks with the minister of defense of the Republic of Poland on the question of our military's presence in Poland, their withdrawal and transit.

[Markowski] Has a final date been set for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Poland?

[Moiseyev] I think that a final date for the withdrawal will be fixed during the summit level meeting between Presidents Gorbachev and Walesa. We in the military, the experts and the diplomats, are setting flexible dates that would suit both sides.

[Markowski] Will the transit of the Soviet forces based in Germany proceed by both road and rail?

[Moiseyev] I think that it will be unnecessary to use the roads. As for transportation by rail, it will be used, and primarily sea routes will be used for the withdrawal.

[Markowski] Was the question of our Army buying Soviet equipment also discussed?

[Moiseyev] Yes, that and, above all, future military cooperation, were among the subjects we discussed with the defense minister of the Republic of Poland today. I think that we share similar viewpoints and approaches to forming new structures that are compatible with European security. We realize that our Armies are equipped with very similar weapons, and from the economic angle it would undoubtedly be unwise and an extremely costly undertaking to change things quickly and radically. Quite simply, from the financial angle, it would not be worth it. For my part, I would like to stress that the Polish Army has very up-to-date weaponry for land, sea, air and defense forces. How to use that equipment and protect it from electronic interference is another issue. I would like to add that we will examine our future bilateral cooperation concerning the supply of spare parts in a way that will suit both sides.



### Lack of Date of Final Soviet Pullout Criticized

AU1703162191 Warsaw *SLOWO POWSZECHNE*  
in Polish 13 Mar 91 p 2

[Piotr Jen commentary]

[Text] The date by which Soviet troops are to leave Poland is the most important unknown quantity in present relations with the USSR. As long as the date remains unresolved, a problem of priority political importance remains unsolved, for Poland is the only country with Soviet troops on its soil with which no conditions for the withdrawal of these troops have been finalized and, more importantly, no final date has been set.

After the talks with General Moiseyev, chief of the Soviet General Staff, we know that the date will be earlier than the one originally suggested by the Soviet side, the middle of 1994; however, the exact date will not be established until the meeting between Walesa and Gorbachev next month. Nevertheless, it is a fact that the Soviet Union is delaying the conclusion of such an important agreement.

The problem is the 30-month time difference between the Polish and Soviet proposed dates. Poland has been ready to hold talks on this subject for a long time. Even a compromise solution, a withdrawal halfway between the two proposals—i.e. in the first half of 1993—would be satisfactory; however, there is still no sign of any willingness on Moscow's part to accept such a solution. Instead, one can see Moscow's desire to combine this matter with the problem of accommodating the troops withdrawn from Poland and the other countries, a problem mainly concerning a shortage of housing.

Obviously, our country cannot accept any financial commitments for solving this problem. In any case, there is money for it—mainly German money. What we can do is help build apartments in the USSR, because our building enterprises have spare capacity. The conditions governing their involvement in this undertaking could be agreed upon, but in no way can one combine this matter with an agreement on the date of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland.

The compromise achieved during the talks with General Moiseyev in Warsaw is not satisfactory. The mere start of the withdrawal of Soviet forces in April does not solve the problem. Without establishing the date by which the withdrawal must be completed, one cannot establish final conditions for the transit through Poland of Soviet troops from the former GDR; therefore the scope of the matter is much broader than Soviet-Polish bilateral relations. This is another reason why Poland is more anxious than the Soviet Union to have a rapid and clear solution to this problem.

### Defense Minister Views Soviet Troop Withdrawal

AU1803090091 Warsaw *POLSKA ZBROJNA* in Polish  
13 Mar 91 p 2

[Interview with Defense Minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk by Jerzy Markowski; place and date not given: "Soviet Forces To Be Withdrawn Starting April"]

[Text] [Markowski] What comments would you make about the meeting that has just ended?

[Kolodziejczyk] It was a heated meeting, but one that was constructive at the same time. During today's talks, we discussed bilateral contacts, cooperation, and—this was surely the subject that aroused the most emotion—questions concerning European security in the future, and questions connected with the Vienna agreements, which, as we know, are threatened, because of problems pertaining to their ratification. My impression was that the chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff displayed a desire to achieve rapid progress along this path, and that is very important.

[Markowski] Did you discuss the possibility of inspecting Soviet forces on Polish territory?

[Kolodziejczyk] It was not one of the main issues under discussion, but both sides are aware that in the case of this type of inspection it is difficult to talk about building confidence, and it is difficult to talk about disarmament.

[Markowski] Did you discuss purchasing Soviet weapons for the Polish Armed Forces?

[Kolodziejczyk] Yes, the subject was raised. It is one of the important points, but talks will be continued next week at the expert level. We will have concrete facts once the negotiations are over.

[Markowski] Admiral, it is not just a question of buying, but also of training, as General Moiseyev suggested a moment ago....

[Kolodziejczyk] That is right, and we have to begin by, unfortunately, stating certain obvious facts. One European security system has come to an end. A new one has to be built and it has to be built on the basis of bilateral contacts without any kind of preferential treatment and with the involvement of everyone who is interested. Representatives of the USSR have displayed an interest in developing good-neighborly political relations, and as far as military matters are concerned, they are in favor of continuing cooperation in the military sphere. So, there are parallels with the Czech lands and Slovakia, and with the Republic of Hungary, and it will include training exchanges, joint scientific and research work, and work in other fields. All avenues are open for the development of good, partner-like arrangements with all our neighbors, with all the states in Europe, and even with such large states as the Soviet Union.

[Markowski] To return to the question of the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Poland and the transit question—it would appear that the Soviet side has given up plans to use overland routes.

[Kolodziejczyk] It has not abandoned the use of overland routes entirely, because I am sure that they will want to use the railroads. They want to give up the idea of using roads, however, because that is surely in keeping with the expectations of all the citizens of our state. The Soviet Union's flexible position on this is pleasing, although I would like to stress once again that this was not the main subject of our talks. Our Soviet guests told us what great problems they would experience, beginning with housing. We appreciate all these problems, but we have been stressing that we have our own problems, including housing ones.

[Markowski] Did the upcoming summit visit contribute something to the atmosphere?

[Kolodziejczyk] Undoubtedly, I think things will proceed at a faster pace following this visit.

[Markowski] After his meeting with Minister Skubiszewski yesterday, General Moiseyev talked about beginning the withdrawal of forces from Poland in April or May of this year. Did you discuss this today, and which units would be moved out first?

[Kolodziejczyk] It would seem appropriate at this point to discuss the schedule, which has been prepared in detail for some time now, but there is one thing that I would like to stress—the desire to begin the process by moving out the command of the Western Regional Military Command, which is of great political significance and is surely the right way to begin a complete withdrawal. It concerns the command in Leningrad, which was previously in Swidnice—that is, the highest command body in the theater of operations. Some units have already been withdrawn, [bridging] pontoon battalions, logistics units, and so on, but in this case, the withdrawal will be entirely different in qualitative terms. If there is no command, the grouping ceases to exist. The evacuation of the command will undoubtedly begin in the first half of this year, but there are still no definite decisions to the effect that it will take place in April or May. Concerning the withdrawal of Soviet forces, I hope that next week's negotiations in Moscow will be completed and an appropriate treaty will be signed, but so much progress has been made in preparing and planning the whole operation that April is a realistic date for beginning the process of withdrawing the forces.

General Moiseyev and I agreed that there is no operational justification for the presence of line and combat units on Polish territory. The Soviet side has problems, because there is no physical location to which the units can be moved and only these problems—in their opinion—are an obstacle to the rapid execution of the operation. Everything else is the subject of negotiations that are still in progress.

[Markowski] Admiral, what exactly has made the Soviet position more flexible?

[Kolodziejczyk] As a private observer of these events, because the Defense Ministry is performing an auxiliary role and the political issues are being settled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the government, my impression is that it was a question of costs. The Soviet Union is struggling with financial problems just as much as we are and that is probably what caused a certain hardening of their position during the first stage of the talks. Right now, it seems that the issue is closer to being resolved amicably on the basis of mutual concessions and mutual flexibility in approaching the issue.

[Markowski] Does the current visit mark the end of the period of arriving at a bilateral agreement with the USSR?

[Kolodziejczyk] General Moiseyev's visit represents the preparation of a bilateral agreement with the USSR. It even settles substantive issues connected with Marshal Yazov's visit, which will undoubtedly take place in the future, but at the moment it is difficult to give a precise date.

### Three USSR Convoys Arrive From Former GDR

LD1703185891 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish  
1800 GMT 17 Mar 91

[Text] Last night, three Soviet military convoys from former GDR territory reported to Kunowice station in Gorzow Province. Customs clearance took place without any problems. The Soviet convoys possessed all the necessary documents and were not carrying any radioactive materials or chemical agents. The convoys were directed toward Terespol.

### Foreign Minister on Soviet Troop Withdrawal, Transit

LD1803193291 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish  
1800 GMT 18 Mar 91

[Text] Here are details of the remarks by Foreign Affairs Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski when asked whether the Polish attitude had changed over the connection between the withdrawal of the Soviet Army from Eastern Germany and its withdrawal from Poland. Here is what the head of Polish diplomacy said:

[Begin Skubiszewski recording] Poland never wanted—she did not even think of it—to block the transit of the Soviet troops from Germany to the USSR. It is in the interest of all of Europe as well as Poland that the Soviet Army be withdrawn from the former area of the GDR, and we are doing everything in our power, although that entire enormous operation was decided by the Germans and the USSR without any kind of understanding with us—after all we are the transit state. The issue requires particular regulation.



That transit is so enormous—I am not going to repeat well-known facts—that a separate treaty is needed, although there has not been one so far, so it can take place in an orderly, peaceful, and civilized manner and so any difficulties or incidents can be resolved on a legal and political basis. I think that the Polish attitude here is both in the German and Soviet interest, although I must say with certain surprise that this was not always understood in the West and in the East.

After all, the draft of the transit treaty is a Polish draft—at the beginning we heard that that transit could take place without any treaty regulation. I cannot imagine that either of these two states, the FRG or the USSR, if they were to be involved with a similar transit, would agree to its being carried out without a treaty.

We anticipate that the peak of the transit from Germany, if the dates are not changed, will fall in 1992 and 1993. That is why it would be better if the Soviet Army left Poland before that transit peak, and we are also talking about this and hope that they will even start to leave Poland before too long—as soon as April and May. The operations vary in scope. There is a far larger Army in the FRG, and that is why the withdrawal of the Soviet Army from Poland can and should take place considerably more quickly. [end recording]

#### Official Interviewed on Soviet Withdrawal Plans

AU2703102791 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish  
23-24 Mar 91 pp 1, 7

[Interview with General Zdzislaw Ostrowski, government plenipotentiary for affairs concerning Soviet troops in Poland, by Maria Wagrowska; place and date not given: "The USSR Wants To Pull Out by the End of 1993"]

[Text] [Wagrowska] You attended the last round of talks between Poland and the USSR in Moscow on 19 and 20 March on the subject of the Soviet forces in Poland. What progress was achieved concerning their pullout?

[Ostrowski] We concentrated on the transit through Poland of the Soviet troops due to leave the territory of the former GDR. This transit and the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Poland are mutually connected. As soon as the withdrawal of the troops from Poland commences, Poland will agree to the start of the transit movements from Germany. We learned that by 28 March, the Soviet Union is to make a formal application to us for the use of 800 railroad carriages so that it can begin the removal of supplies in April. Although that does not represent the beginning of the Soviet pullout from Poland, it is a prerequisite for the beginning of the transit from Germany. The Polish Government is to adopt a stance within the next few days.

[Wagrowska] Why in the next few days?

[Ostrowski] Because the Soviet side expects that as soon as it has applied for the railroad carriages, the Polish side

will give the go-ahead for the transit to start on 1 April, and the next round of talks is scheduled to take place after that date.

[Wagrowska] Does that mean that the Soviet troops in Poland will leave by rail, just like the ones leaving Germany?

[Ostrowski] Most of the forces, 80 to 85 percent, will be withdrawn by rail. Individual transports may proceed by road. One must also expect movements by road between the Soviet bases and the railheads.

[Wagrowska] From where would Poland like the Soviet troops to be withdrawn first?

[Ostrowski] We still expect a withdrawal in 1991. [answer as published]

[Wagrowska] But there is still no schedule for it, not even an outline.

[Ostrowski] The percentages of forces to be withdrawn each year have already been established. The Soviet side plans to withdraw 20 to 25 percent of its forces, i.e. about 10,000 men and 30,000 units, in 1991, between 35 and 40 percent in 1992, and the same percentage in 1993. Thus, the USSR would like to extend this process over two and a half years.

[Wagrowska] Which units would be the first to go?

[Ostrowski] If I understand correctly, the first unit the Soviet Union wants to withdraw in 1991 is the warfare command center in Legnica, which controlled every unit in Poland, Germany, and Czechoslovakia, plus several other pioneer, supply, and missile units. The Soviet Union does not want to withdraw any combat units except for one air squadron in Brzeg, whereas Poland wants combat units to be the first to go because it is these units that cause the greatest inconvenience to our society, such as the air force units in Brzeg, Szprotawa, Stara Kopernia, Legnica, and Zagan. In reply to my suggestion, General Dubynin, commander of the Northern Group of Forces, has said that the Soviet Union will consider withdrawing more air force units.

[Wagrowska] Why does the Soviet Union not wish to withdraw its combat units first? What reasons does it give?

[Ostrowski] Because there is nowhere to put them, no barracks and no airfields.

[Wagrowska] But there is somewhere to put the engineering units?

[Ostrowski] Evidently there is, probably because these units are smaller. Another reason given by the Soviet Union is a shortage of housing, mainly for officers and their families, and I think we should take this factor into account for humanitarian reasons, even though this is a Soviet problem, not ours. We are also waiting for the

accommodation occupied by Soviet families in Poland to be vacated, and we should appreciate the problem.

[Wagrowska] Do you not think the reason why the Soviet Union is unwilling to withdraw quickly from Poland is because of the importance that the Soviet military apparatus attaches to the USSR's great power status and because disarmament commitments have not been met?

[Ostrowski] I do not see why that should be the case.

[Wagrowska] A controversial issue is the fact that the Soviet Union has refused permission for a Polish team of inspectors to check Soviet bases for the presence of chemical weapons. Are we going to reapply for permission?

[Ostrowski] Yes. We would like to carry out this inspection at a time and place unknown to the Soviet side, i.e. a "surprise inspection. General Dubynin has already agreed.

[Wagrowska] There are also rumors that the withdrawal of individual Soviet units has been arranged on the basis of agreements concluded between the Soviet command and the administration of the voivodship in which the relevant unit is situated.

[Ostrowski] That is a misunderstanding. Withdrawal can only occur on one single basis created by the central agreement.

[Wagrowska] Has the problem of Polish civilians who suffered harm at the hands of Soviet soldiers and their families been resolved? After all, some people died.

[Ostrowski] All these matters have either been settled or are in the process of being settled.

[Wagrowska] Regardless of how long the Soviet forces stay in Poland, the question of their legal status in Poland is yet to be resolved.

[Ostrowski] Their present status is defined by rules established on 17 December 1956 or agreements concluded with individual ministries slightly later. These rules bear absolutely no relationship whatsoever to the Poland of today and our present legal, financial, and ecological legislation, therefore it is necessary to negotiate with the Soviet side new rules applicable to the

forces due to remain in Poland until the end of 1993 according to the Soviet timetable. I repeat, the Polish Government has still not spoken out on this subject. The establishment of new rules is essential for the sake of a good climate in our relations. The Soviet units in Poland cannot be immune to Polish law. They are already enjoying conditions far more favorable than the ones in the Polish Army, which has to pay for everything.

[Wagrowska] So what are the Polish side's demands?

[Ostrowski] Virtually everything has to be changed, because so far the Soviet Union has only paid maintenance costs. As far as rent is concerned, it has only been paying 50 percent rent, and only at 1975 rates. It does not pay any fines for damaging the environment and utilizing agricultural land, training areas, and so on. The bills for all this must be settled in hard currency, just as in trade.

[Wagrowska] What about Poland's claims for the losses it has suffered for almost 50 years?

[Ostrowski] We wish to list them, therefore the Office of the Plenipotentiary is now asking various government economic offices to perform calculations. These will take into account the losses incurred due to reduced payments, an absence of payments altogether, the impossibility of using the land occupied by the Soviet forces, and all the different kinds of physical damage. That should provide an overall picture of the costs.

[Wagrowska] But that will result in an astronomical sum of money.

[Ostrowski] Yes, but on the other hand the Soviet Union has built thousands of buildings in Poland out of its own money and resources. These will be valued and bought by Poland as long as they conform to our building regulations. We want to balance the account. On the Polish side there is a desire to clear the account altogether and bid farewell to the Soviet Union as a partner with whom we will coexist to mutual advantage and develop mutual relations. But we cannot forsake our interests. In article three of the 1956 treaty, the Soviet Union committed itself to an observance of Polish legislation, therefore the continued presence of the Soviet Army must be based on the legislation adopted or amended since that year.

## INDIA

### Space Launch Vehicle Rocket Motor Tested

BK2403044291 Delhi Domestic Service in English  
0240 GMT 24 Mar 91

[Text] The Indian space research organization reached another milestone in the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle [PSLV] program yesterday. It successfully completed the ground testing of the powerful booster rocket motor and its control system at Sriharikota in Andhra Pradesh. This is the second test of the booster solid rocket motor. It has established the design and performance of the rocket motor and its components. The 2.8 meter diameter rocket motor is currently the third largest of its kind in the world. It has been designed by Vikram Tara Bhai Space Center at Trivandrum.

## IRAN

### Spokesman Affirms 'Right' To Chemical Weapons

LD1403152791 Tehran IRNA in English 1422 GMT  
14 Mar 91

[Text] Tehran, March 14 (IRNA)—A senior Iranian official on Thursday stated that Iran should have the capability for neutralizing the destructive effects of chemical weapons, in view of the access of its neighbours to such lethal arms. "More studies and research is needed on ways of averting the use of chemical weapons and neutralizing their effects," Hoseyn Firuzabadi, chief of the Armed Forces Command Headquarters said.

Firuzabadi was speaking at a seminar to study effects of chemical arms and chemical agents, held in memory of the victims of the Iraqi Government's chemical attacks during the 8-year war especially on the Iraqi town of Halabjah and the northwestern Iranian town of Sardasht. "Iran's border areas were attacked with toxic arms 400 times by Iraq during its war against the Islamic Republic, and the crime claimed a large number of civilians and combatants as victims," he said. "The chemical arms used by Iraq included hand grenades, mortar and artillery shells, bombs and rockets, filled with mustard, suffocating and sometimes nerve gases," added Firuzabadi. The Iraqi chemical attack on Sardasht, he recalled, wounded 7,000 people, while some two years before that 30,000 Iranian combatants were chemically wounded in the southern fronts during the "Val-Fajr-8" operations on February 10, 1986.

On the chemical arms potential of Iran's neighbours and the superpowers, and the threats they could pose to the country, Firuzabadi pointed out that "the U.S. naval fleets in the Persian Gulf are equipped with chemical arms. Iraq possesses them (chemical arms). Turkey has access to such arms because of its membership in NATO. The Soviet Union has large stockpiles of chemical agents. Afghanistan because of its dependence on Moscow has got these arms and used them against the mujahideen."

Elsewhere in his speech, Firuzabadi regretted that none of the countries who are signatories to international conventions banning the use of chemical weapons had condemned Iraq for its chemical attacks on Iran. He insisted on research and said "therefore, we reserve the right for ourselves to get technological knowhow necessary to confront the chemical agents our enemies might use against us."

### Daily Urges Upgrading Long-Range Missile Forces

LD1703190491 Tehran IRNA in English 1804 GMT  
17 Mar 91

[Text] Tehran, March 17 (IRNA)—In a commentary titled 'A Military Lesson From the P.G. War', an English daily called for upgrading of the country's air defense system.

KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL wrote that the 6-week war between the U.S.-led forces and Iraq conveyed a "very important military message" for the Third World countries and particularly the Islamic Republic of Iran and that is "the importance and significance of missiles, either anti-aircraft or surface-to-surface ones."

Analyzing the defenses on either side against attacks from the skies and the performance of the respective projectiles, it said that "it is important for Tehran to take the necessary measures to build up its own mobile short, medium and longrange surface-to-surface as well as surface-to-air missiles."

The daily urged the Iranian military planners to learn "this big lesson from the Persian Gulf war and urgently work on new missile projects in order to boost the defense capabilities of the country and minimize possible enemy air and missile strikes against Iran's vital economic centers, as well as military forces."

## IRAQ

### Iraqi Forces Said To Use Acid Against Demonstrators

LD2103105991 Tehran IRNA in English 0846 GMT  
21 Mar 91

[Text] Tehran, March 21 (IRNA)—A leading Iraqi opposition group claimed on Thursday that government helicopters have dropped acid on people demonstrating against the Baghdad regime in Karkuk, killing a large number of them.

The Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution of Iraq (SAIRI), quoting its sources inside Iraq, said popular forces have managed to repair al-Sulaymaniyah's power station and get a firm hold on Karkuk airport. It also reported that pitched battles between government troops and people were going on in southern Mosul. It said the Republican Guards were barring any motor car from entering Mosul.

## GENERAL

### Reports on Baker Visit, Talks in Moscow

#### Baker, Gorbachev Discuss CFE

PM1703144391 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian  
Second Edition 16 Mar 91 p 1,5

[Excerpts] On 15 Mar the USSR president met with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker today. From the very start of their conversation the two men were in the atmosphere of friendly, open dialogue that is characteristic of their personal relations over the last two years at least. [passage omitted]

They examined the problem that has arisen leading up to the ratification of the treaty on conventional arms in Europe. New proposals that will provide a final resolution to the problems that have arisen were put to James Baker, but at first glance these did not satisfy the secretary of state. The experts were at once instructed to rework them and then, perhaps, "conclude the issue" ["zakryt vopros"] in the coming days.

Other questions were also touched on in this conversation lasting almost four hours. It took place in an amicable and sincere atmosphere and marked one more step in the deepening of Soviet-U.S. interaction.

Mikhail Gorbachev asked Mr. Baker to convey to President George Bush his best wishes and his gratitude for the warm letter he recently received from him.

Taking part in the meeting were A.A. Bessmertnykh, A.S. Chernyayev, and D. Ross

#### Experts Discuss CFE, START

LD1503161891 Moscow TASS in English 1513 GMT  
15 Mar 91

[By TASS diplomatic correspondents Mikhail Ivanov, Aleksandr Kanishchev and Igor Peskov]

[Excerpt] Moscow, March 15 (TASS)—Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker held a total of four-odd hours in one-to-one talks on Thursday and Friday. Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman Vitaliy Churkin told a news briefing here today.

He said Baker was meeting President Mikhail Gorbachev in the Kremlin.

Experts, in particular those on disarmament, were holding parallel negotiations. Churkin said.

Those talks were led on the Soviet side by Military Chief of Staff Army General Mikhail Moiseyev and Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksey Obukhov.

Churkin said they had voiced considerations on ways to resolve issues arising in connection with the treaty

limiting conventional weapons in Europe. Those ideas, according to him, "were received by the U.S. experts with interest".

Experts on strategic offensive arms also went into talks today. [passage omitted]

#### Joint News Conference Held

LD1503212991 Moscow TASS in English 2107 GMT  
15 Mar 91

[By TASS diplomatic correspondents Mikhail Ivanov, Aleksandr Kanishchev, Igor Peskov, and Georgiy Shmelev]

[Excerpts] Moscow, March 15 (TASS)—The issue of a new Soviet-U.S. summit has not been specifically discussed. Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh told a news conference here today.

Bessmertnykh was addressing a joint news conference with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker on the results of the latter's meeting with President Mikhail Gorbachev.

"We continue discussing arms reductions, and the date of a new Soviet-U.S. summit will depend on the success of the dialogue. We have an agreement, and I hope the summit will be held in the first half of this year," Bessmertnykh said. [passage omitted]

The Soviet foreign minister stressed that at the talks in Moscow the two sides had discussed Soviet-American relations "in a broad and specific way." "It is very important to state that both sides intend to develop these relations on a stable basis, in all the principal directions," he said. Bessmertnykh pointed out that they had discussed in detail specific issues dealing with bilateral cooperation, for instance, the concluding of additional agreements, "which are ready or will soon be ready to be signed." He expressed hope that some of those agreements might be signed during the next meetings of the two countries' ministers.

"The most important thing is that Soviet-American relations have passed through a complicated trial period and successfully overcame it, thus ensuring for themselves a reliable enough perspective for further development," Bessmertnykh stressed.

Touching upon disarmament problems, Bessmertnykh pointed out that now the main problem was to remove the two countries' misgivings over the treaty on conventional armaments.

"They were discussed during the two rounds of sessions of the working group. We touched upon this problem on the level of ministers, when additional effort was exerted with the aim to "find a way to settling this problem.

"We put forward some proposals which, in our opinion, show the way out. The most important thing is that we do not stop efforts aimed at settling the existing problems," Bessmertnykh said.



According to James Baker, the sides have some problems to settle in connection with conventional armaments in Europe. He said that they had not yet resolved all problems dealing with strategic weapons, that he had just heard a report of the working group: They had been working for two hours, but no agreement had been reached so far. Perhaps, another meeting will be held on Saturday morning. [passage omitted]

### Churkin Briefing on Talks

LD1603135191 Moscow TASS International Service  
in Russian 1255 GMT 16 Mar 91

[By TASS diplomatic correspondents Mikhail Ivanov and Aleksandr Kanishchev]

[Text] Moscow, 16 March (TASS)—“The ministers’ talks showed the reliability of Soviet-American relations, which retain a tendency to develop further,” said Vitaliy Churkin, head of the USSR Foreign Ministry’s Information Directorate, as he summed up at today’s briefing the conversations between USSR Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker in Moscow.

“As a result of the discussions that have taken place, one can speak of a certain advance and of the fact that it has proved possible to bring closer the solution of the questions that still remain,” the USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman noted. “The sides have agreed to continue to maintain permanent contact with each other.”

Vitaliy Churkin announced that, on 16 March, a further meeting had taken place between the heads of the foreign policy departments of the USSR and the United States, which lasted about an hour and a half. Also continuing their meetings first thing in the morning were the two countries’ experts who, in the light of discussion of problems of the talks with the USSR president, were seeking ways and approaches toward removing the anxiety that still exists over questions of conventional weapons and armed forces in Europe.

“For the immediate future, priority in Soviet-American relations will evidently be given to the dialogue on the problems of the Persian Gulf and of the Near East as a whole, and also to completing work on the treaty on strategic offensive arms reduction and removing the anxiety over the treaty on conventional arms in Europe,” the diplomat noted. “A number of new agreements are being prepared in the bilateral sphere which will broaden the basis of Soviet-American cooperation, including economic cooperation.”

Vitaliy Churkin said that in Moscow the sides reaffirmed their desire to complete in the very near future the drawing-up of the strategic offensive arms treaty and sign it at a summit meeting. “The accord under which the summit will be held in the first half of 1991 remains in force,” he said.

In the sphere of conventional arms, the Soviet side—as a gesture of goodwill with the aim of ensuring ratification of the treaty on conventional arms reduction in Europe—put forward a number of ideas which, in his opinion, are a good foundation for achieving mutual understanding and provide answers to all the questions which have arisen in this connection, the USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman said.

“We hope”, he added, “that after these ideas have been studied in Washington, the American side will come to the same conclusion.”

The diplomat noted further that regional problems were given considerable prominence at the talks in Moscow. As a result of their exchange of views on Central American, the USSR foreign minister and the U.S. secretary of state decided to issue a joint statement containing an appeal to the government and the Farabundo Marti Liberation Front of El Salvador to speed up negotiations aimed at ending the conflict and achieving national reconciliation in the interests of progress in that country and regional disarmament throughout Central America.

### Talks Said To Achieve Progress on START

LD1603100591 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak  
Network in Russian 0906 GMT 16 Mar 91

[Excerpt] A few minutes ago the third and final stage of the talks between the foreign ministers of the USSR and the United States ended. Our special correspondent Andrey Ptashnikov has just contacted the studio by telephone. We are listening to you, Andrey.

[Ptashnikov] Hello. You are absolutely right that the talks ended a few minutes ago or, to be absolutely precise, 15 minutes ago. They started at about 1030 [0730 GMT] so they lasted about an hour and a half.

Immediately after the talks, and as you again said correctly, this was the third round, and let me remind you that the previous two take place yesterday and the day before yesterday. So, this was the concluding round, and after the two ministers came out of the hall where the talks had been held, we journalists managed to get interviews with Comrade Bessmertnykh and James Baker. Unfortunately, I do not have with me here the technical equipment to reproduce this recording live on the air, so I shall try to simply restate what the two ministers said.

So, their opinions coincided that the talks were very intensive but useful. They were held on a whole spectrum of problems, from arms limitation to a Near East settlement. It is natural that a very great deal of attention during the discussion was paid to bilateral relations. As Bessmertnykh, USSR foreign minister, stressed, the talks moved relations between the USSR and the United States forward, although there still remain unresolved areas, including in the sphere of disarmament. But the sides agreed to continue to maintain close contacts and



hope that in the near future at least the main issues which will remain unresolved will be resolved.

In particular, progress was achieved on strategic offensive weapons [START]. Let me remind you that the corresponding treaty on strategic offensive weapons is due to be signed during the next Soviet-U.S. summit meeting. Evidently, everyone knows that it is to take place in Moscow. As Comrade Bessmertnykh stressed, the summit meeting, as was planned earlier, will take place during the first half of the year. From this, it follows that in the time remaining until it is held, the corresponding treaty on strategic offensive weapons should be prepared in its final version. [passage omitted]

### Curbs on Third World Arms Sales Urged

91WC0080A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Mar 91  
Second Edition p 6

[Article by Prof Aleksandr Migolatyev under the rubric "Viewpoint": "Strokes Adued to the Portrait of the War"]

[Text] The war in the Persian Gulf is over, but we do not know everything about it yet. Only the news headlines, perhaps, have been written so far, not the history of this "biggest international conflict of the detente era." Its true driving forces, hidden springs, and possible consequences will emerge. But some personal conclusions suggest themselves even today.

Thus the problem of the weapons that were actually employed in the war or which were in readiness for use in the military theater would seem particularly important to me.

I recall that according to figures of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), in the period 1983-1987 the Near East accounted for 48.4 percent of the cost of imports of weapons, combat equipment, and munitions obtained by all countries of the "Third World" (\$54.1 out of \$111.7 billion). In recent years up to three-fourths of all arms have been exported to these countries. Consequently, to avoid a repetition of the conflicts in this and other regions, it is essential to adopt urgent and effective measures to limit exports of arms and military technology. Yet the war had barely ended before arms manufacturers, particularly in the United States, were already concocting new plans to increase military supplies to this region. Does this not reek of money?

The war in the Gulf also revealed the danger of using weapons of mass destruction and of the chemical and bacteriological contamination of the population and the terrain. And the proliferation of chemical weapons, this "poor man's nuclear weapon," needs, specifically, to be emphatically countered here. Operation Desert Storm showed, in addition, that many types of conventional offensive arms, missiles and bombs included or approached the destructive potential of tactical nuclear

weapons. Is it not time to impose, through an international legal procedure, limitations on the qualitative upgrading of conventional weapons?

I turn from the military to the political aspects. In the United States, the vestiges of the "Vietnam syndrome" have been canceled out by the jingoistic-patriotic intoxication and admiration for American weapons. But is the price paid by the peoples (not only of Kuwait and Iraq) for this victory not too high? I personally very much doubt that there was optimum correlation of the main parameters of this military operation. After all, if, as Hegel put it, the end justifies the means, was it permissible, while rightly smashing the aggressor and his bunker clique and army of occupation, to deal so brutally with his people—an inheritor of the thousand-year Arab civilization and Muslim culture? May the "carpet bombing," destruction of shelters, and the use of the giant B-52 strategic bombers and the main battery guns of the battleship Missouri be considered justified even for the sake of liberating the victim of aggression? Is it not time to renounce the militarist "winners are not questioned" credo?

However, the most essential conclusion from the conflict, in my view, is the fact that we should aspire to the restoration of peace and security primarily through the use of political, economic, and other nonmilitary means. In this respect, given the importance of the resolutions passed by the United Nations and its Security Council, the latter bodies did not make proper use of their power. Traditional military approaches and instincts gained the upper hand, particularly when a realistic opportunity to halt the escalation of the armed violence had emerged. It seems to me that as a result, serious damage was done to the new concept of political thinking. We need to think about the creation of a universally dependable system of safeguards for the unconditional prevention of aggression, occupation, and annexation in any form and right at the start. Otherwise, the involvement of dozens of new states in armed conflicts will be permanent, and military triumph may once again become a permanent component of international life. This cannot be permitted.

### Administration Report on Soviet Treaty Compliance Assailed

PM2003155791 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 20 Mar 91 First Edition p 5

[From the "Observer's Comments" column by Captain S. Sidorov: "New Report—Well-Worn Theme"]

[Text] Over the past few years, the U.S. Administration has regularly submitted to Congress a report "On the Soviet Union's Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements." This year was no exception either: The latest report was examined on Capitol Hill.

The fact that it appeared somewhat later than expected is perhaps the only way in which it differs from its predecessors. Otherwise it is a typical—however sad it is to acknowledge this today—product of “cold war” times.

There are a number of nonspecific complaints in the report relating to the as yet unratified treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe, so I will not touch on them, especially since KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has already voiced its opinion on this (see KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 16 February). As for the other “concerns,” they are mainly accusations for the sake of accusations.

See for yourselves. The Soviet Union is, for example, charged with permitting the discharge of radioactive products when it carried out one underground nuclear test last year—incidentally, the United States carried out nine such explosions. The report acknowledges that the United States does not know for sure whether there was a violation or not; it will “pass judgment on this question after studying the information.” Why then, one wonders, tell the whole wide world about it first? Why not do the opposite—investigate first—as logic would dictate?

The reason for the complaint is there on the surface—it has to affect a quite serious and sensitive area to produce the desired effect. Have you recognized the hand behind this? It is almost like that of Kozma Prutkov: “When you throw pebbles in the water, look at the ripples they form; otherwise it’ll be a futile pastime!..”

If any reader thinks that clumsiness and ordinary bad manners are characteristic of anyone but the U.S. political elite, then here is another example for you. In his report at a UN forum in May 1989, a Soviet defense industry representative said that the Soviet Union had produced 450 SS-23’s since 1978, including dummy and sectional mockups of this missile. The Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles encompassed 239 missiles—the number in existence at the time it was signed in December 1987. Some 72 standard-issue missiles with high-explosive fragmentation warheads were sold to Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and the GDR before the treaty came into force. As for the rest, they were used for tests, instruction, and combat training—once again before the treaty began to operate.

Citing the Soviet representative’s report, the administration said: The fact that the United States does not know for certain what has happened to the missiles not included in the Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles illustrates the Soviets’ unscrupulousness. We have once again been deceived, they say, let them now account for every missile.

But gentlemen! First, if you want to know this—I can understand that in general, although it has no direct bearing on the treaty—do as normal people do: set out your request or, better still, appeal to the joint working commission. Second, if you know how you can satisfactorily prove that missiles still exist after launches, share this with us, and tell us at the same time where the many

hundreds of your Pershing-1A missiles that did not fall within the scope of the treaty have disappeared to.

Some of the problems broached in the report are strictly pro forma since these problems are, effectively, a closed subject now. For example, in accordance with the agreement reached, the Soviet side is obliged to eliminate the Krasnoyarsk radar, built in the past in violation of the ABM Treaty. This measure has already, in effect, been implemented—the Krasnoyarsk radar has been dismantled so that today it is harder to render it operational than to build a new one. The report’s authors are well aware of that. Just as they are aware that the Americans’ construction of ballistic missile early warning stations with forbidden parameters and outside U.S. national territory—in Greenland and Britain—is in contravention of the same ABM Treaty. The U.S. side describes this not as the construction of new but as the “modernization of old stations,” which is not banned by the treaty. Then it looks as though a howitzer is not a howitzer, but a modernized slingshot.

In short, while proclaiming certain aims in the report, the administration is pursuing totally different, quite matter-of-fact aims. The report was submitted to Congress at a time when it had begun to consider the latest draft military budget. The report is to a considerable extent designed to whet the appetite.

I am afraid that the approaches and methods characteristic of the current document submitted by the U.S. Administration by no means promote confidence-building in Soviet-U.S. relations. I would further say that its appearance seems another indication that these relations are moving back from cooperation and partnership. To be honest, I would very much like to be mistaken.

## START TALKS

### Diplomat Blames U.S. For START Treaty Delay

LD1503164391 Moscow TASS International Service  
in Russian 1511 GMT 15 Mar 91

[By TASS diplomatic correspondents Aleksandr Kanishchev, Igor Peskov, and Georgiy Shmelev]

[Text] Moscow, 15 March—A display of “political will” is the necessary condition for the rapid conclusion of work on the strategic offensive weapons treaty, a high-ranking Soviet diplomat believes. At the request of the TASS correspondents today, he described the current state of affairs at the talks on strategic offensive weapons.

In his opinion, the solution of the problem “is mainly in the hands of the Americans now, and as soon as they make the political decision to conclude the treaty, the work will proceed.” At the same time, he pointed out the importance of mutual compromises without which the treaty cannot be concluded. “However,” he added, “to

speak frankly, we see no readiness on the part of the U.S. side to meet us halfway. Indeed, as the USSR foreign minister said yesterday, the treaty is virtually 98 percent prepared; some 2-3 percent is needed to resolve "technical questions." But at the final stage, the United States cited the war in the Persian Gulf or, as now, the postwar settlement, the diplomat noted.

Among the 2-3 percent of the unresolved questions, the diplomat named the problem of telemetry, which crops up throughout all the talks on strategic offensive weapons. "The point here is that both sides are agreed in principle on providing access to the other side to the telemetric information which is transmitted from ballistic missiles when they are launched. But the USSR and the United States each have a different practice for broadcasting such information. The essence of the matter is to arrive at a common denominator and not infringe either side," he said.

Another problem, the diplomat said, is connected with seeking ways of carrying out continuous observation (one of the forms of verification) of production plants (for producing strategic offensive weapons—TASS note). One other question exists connected with monitoring. Accords have been reached on inspection, but the problem has arisen of "scale criteria"—what to look at and what not to look at. Here, too, the sides have different practices.

According to the diplomat, much will depend on what proposals the U.S. delegation has brought with it to Moscow. However, he added, in any event, the talks cannot be concluded here: agreement can be reached in principle in Moscow, which will subsequently be translated into the language of an agreement in Geneva. "In my personal opinion," he said in conclusion, "if there is the political decision and subsequent intensive work by the sides over two to three weeks, success is 'physically and technically realistic.' But the more time that passes, the more 'underwater rocks' of various kinds appear."

#### **Baker Comments on Delay in START Conclusion Viewed**

*PM1803195191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
19 Mar 91 Union Edition p 4*

[Report by correspondent A. Shalnev: "Why Is Signing of Treaty Being Delayed? James Baker's Statement After Moscow Visit"]

[Excerpt] New York—U.S. Secretary of State James Baker has admitted that it is not Moscow but Washington that is blocking the conclusion of the treaty on strategic offensive arms. The treaty should have been signed as long ago as last December, but there is still a big question mark over the timing of its signing.

The following question was put to Baker, who was appearing in Sunday's ABC-TV program "This Week with David Brinkley": "As much as one year ago it was being said that the strategic arms treaty had almost been elaborated and that just a few technical details were outstanding. Are you prepared to conclude that the Soviet military are simply trying to stop what the politicians would like to advance?"

"We do have such a concern," said the secretary of state, who has just returned from a lengthy foreign tour, including a visit to the Soviet Union, "but it is with regard to the agreement on conventional types of arms (signed in Paris last November—A.Sh.). This in turn is holding up progress in the strategic arms sphere. It is not so much a matter of the strategic arms treaty as of the interpretation of the differences that we have with regard to the accord on conventional arms. It will be difficult to conclude the strategic offensive arms treaty until we have investigated these differences. Incidentally, just two questions remain there."

What James Baker deemed it possible to declare in public confirms the speculation in the U.S. press, from which it follows that Washington has noticeably lost interest in the fate of the accords on strategic offensive arms which are almost ready but which have still not been completely elaborated. As the commentators Evans and Novak pointed out recently: "Having won the war in the Persian Gulf, President Bush has made it known to his advisers that the strategic offensive arms treaty is no longer the sacred political and military symbol of ensuring security that it once was. The President has even ventured to discourse out loud about the 'unipolar' world in which nothing threatens U.S. might, since it has no equals, and in which arms control and even summit meetings are no longer absolutely necessary."

Incidentally, this was also manifested in the support which the quite recent initiative of Senator John Warner, who is seeking a revision of the 1972 Soviet-U.S. ABM Treaty, has received from the White House and, in particular, from Brent Scowcroft, the President's assistant for national security affairs. The purpose of the senator's initiative, which has at present come to a halt but, it seems to me, will still be continued, boils down to lifting the restrictions on the development and testing of new ABM systems, including the "Star Wars" system.

Returning to Baker's television appearance, it must be pointed out that, as the secretary of state emphasized, he does not yet intend to recommend to the President that the Paris agreement be submitted to the Senate for ratification. Reporting that the Soviet side had made some proposals at the talks in Moscow and "gone in our direction," Baker said: "But this is not enough." From the viewpoint of the secretary of state, the disagreements between Moscow and Washington over the Paris agreement can be accounted for, in particular, by the position of the military in the USSR. [Passage omitted]

**U.S. Said To 'Block' START Treaty Completion**

*LD2103181291 Moscow World Service in English  
1210 GMT 21 Mar 91*

[Yuri Solton commentary]

[Text] In his speech in one of the subcommittees of the U.S. Senate, Ronald Lehman, the head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, accused the Soviet Union of violating the conditions of the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe. The treaty, providing for a considerable reduction in offensive conventional weapons, was signed by the leaders of 22 countries in Paris last November, but owing to different interpretations of some of its provisions, the treaty's ratification is delayed. Yuri Solton now comments:

Washington officials claim that the Soviet Union has taken three divisions with (?their) military equipment, including 3,500 tanks, out of the treaty's control. Experts should decide if these claims are justified.

Incidentally, during his last week's visit to Moscow, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker was informed about new Soviet proposals that may ensure a final solution of all the problems but the proposals failed to satisfy the secretary of state. Experts were then instructed to rework them in order to resolve the issue as soon as in the next few days. So, there is a chance to reach an agreement without any fuss quite calmly. Instead, Washington keeps putting forward demands at various levels to toughen the U.S. stand and questions the need to trust the Soviet Union. Honestly speaking, this can't help but arouse our concern. Statements of this kind play into the hands of those forces here and in the United States who are eager to frustrate the disarmament process. James Baker has actually admitted that the United States blocks the work aimed at finalizing the START agreement, though only two problems connected with it remain unsolved. And, in the Senate, the motion was tabled—which failed, though, to pass through—that the Soviet-U.S. ABM treaty be revised so that the Star Wars program could be carried on without any hindrance. All these facts, however, are pretty alarming, I find.

The logical question arises at this point: Isn't this the effect of the (?Persian) syndrome? As the U.S. press contends, after winning an easy victory over Iraq, the United States lost interest in disarmament agreements with the Soviet Union. The authors of some articles claim that President Bush gave some of his advisers to understand that, for him, the START Treaty was no longer a sacred political and military symbol bound to ensure security as it once used to be. I don't know to what extent statements of this kind reflect the real state of affairs, but one thing is clear: the relations of trust established between the two countries can't be undermined; attempts to cast a shadow on Soviet-U.S. partnership—and such attempts are being made both in the Soviet Union and in the United States—can't be transferred to a state level. Trust is a pretty fragile thing. Yuri Solton writes in conclusion.

**SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS****Warner Proposal on ABM Treaty Seen Affecting START**

*LD1403230491 Moscow TASS International Service  
in Russian 1427 GMT 14 Mar 91*

[By TASS military affairs observer Vladimir Bogachev]

[Text] Moscow, 14 March (TASS)—There are reports from Washington that the Bush Administration does not consider the treaty that is being prepared on strategic offensive armaments [START] "as significant a military-political symbol for ensuring security as it seemed in the past."

Exactly to what extent these reports in THE WASHINGTON POST reflect the position of the U.S. Administration on arms control issues will be shown by the future, perhaps even the next few days. There is already absolutely reliable information that a proposal has been tabled in the U.S. Senate that the 1972 Soviet-U.S. treaty on limiting ABM systems be reviewed for the purpose of giving the United States an opportunity to develop and test space-based anti-missile missiles. This proposal, if adopted by the Senate, will not be mandatory for the U.S. Administration. It is notable that a number of senators who previously opposed the Star Wars program do not object to the adoption of the resolution on the United States' virtual renunciation of the ABM treaty.

Influential circles in Washington are evidently trying to re-animate the odious aims of the "strong arm" policy even amid the real easing of international tension. This, obviously, makes one think about real U.S. military and political aims, not only in the past, but also in the future. What will happen in the world if the U.S. Administration allows itself to be led by the militant senators who, it seems, are intoxicated by the victory over Saddam Husayn, and will answer the unilateral arms reduction made by USSR and the Soviet troop withdrawal from East Europe by building up strategic offensive systems and subverting the treaty on limitation of anti-missile systems? It is quite obvious that there will not be good results either for the United States or for the rest of the world. The first casualty of such a course taken by Washington will probably be the arms control process, with all the sad consequences resulting from this.

In a recent television address, U.S. Vice President Quayle expected that in the event of the United States renouncing the ABM treaty, the Soviet Union would follow Washington's example and begin to develop its own space-based anti-missile system.

Quayle is probably a supporter of the concept of Edward Teller, a rather well-known "hawk" who used to advocate that the USSR should be drawn into developing the most expensive armaments so as to create new difficulties on the path of the development of the Soviet economy. Such expectations are totally groundless.



One should like to hope that the news that the United States is preparing to turn back from its course on "establishing the new order of peace and justice" which it has announced, toward resuming confrontation and the arms race is not true and will be denied by Washington.

### **Move To Reconsider U.S. ABM Treaty Adherence Scored**

PM2203161591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian  
21 Mar 91 Second Edition p 4

[Report by correspondent V. Gan: "By Hook or by Crook"]

[Text] Washington—It is only thanks to successful maneuvering in the Senate by the Democrats headed by Sam Nunn that a new attempt by "star wars" supporters to undermine the Soviet-U.S. ABM Treaty has failed.

The attacks on this key agreement, which has prevented the militarization of space for almost 20 years, had abated for a while. The SDI program launched by the previous Reagan Administration had lost a notable number of enthusiasts because of its potential danger and astronomic cost. Congress was being increasingly tight-fisted, allocating fewer and fewer dollars for its development [razrabotka]. The end of the "cold war" in general ought to have pushed the program into the background. But suddenly a "hot" war appeared—in the Gulf—with, so people here believe, its triumph for U.S. arms.

Against the backdrop of a wave of exultation—in which the U.S. military-industrial complex has clearly had a hand—military-industrial complex lobbyists in Congress have been trying to prevent SDI from being left high and dry. Republican Senator J. Warner of Virginia submitted a proposal calling for talks between the USSR and the United States on revising the ABM Treaty with a view to removing its restrictions on the development [razrabotka] of ABM defense systems.

Senator Nunn, an opponent of any revision of the ABM Treaty, outsmarted Warner, however. In response to his draft resolution the influential chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee put forward a counterproposal which also played on the upsurge of pride in U.S. technology by envisaging an increase in appropriations for Pentagon purchases of Patriot missiles—from \$100 million to \$224 million—and stationing them on ships for rapid deployment to areas of crisis. At the same time, the senator recommended that \$218 million be redirected within the SDI program to expedite production of land-based ABM defense systems.

The whole affair can, of course, be presented as normal parliamentary games—the type "played" by legislators virtually every day. But this time it is a question of far more serious matters. It is being predicted here that, following the Gulf War and the complacency about victory, the language of the arms race may come back

into fashion in America. It seems that this prediction is accurate. At any rate, Warner's legislative attack on the ABM Treaty was supported by the Bush administration, ranking representatives of which spent the whole week in consultations with the senator on the text of the resolution.

Is this a hint that they will be seeking the "right moment"? Undoubtedly. Not for nothing are newspapers here writing about a "temporary failure" for the administration and its supporters on Capitol Hill. So in the very near future we should expect the campaigns against this most important treaty, which has kept space peaceful, to be stepped up. Probably not just this document either....

### **INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES**

#### **Last U.S. Cruise Missiles Out of Comiso**

91WC0086A Moscow TRUD in Russian 28 Mar 91 p 1

[Article by TRUD's own correspondent P. Negoitsa: "The Last Missiles Are Removed"]

[Text] Rome, 27 March—The last cruise missiles have been removed from the NATO base in Comiso, which is in Sicily. The Americans took this step in accordance with the U.S.-USSR treaty of 8 December 1987, signed by R. Reagan and M. Gorbachev. The missiles were shipped by airplane to a base in the state of Arizona, where they will be completely eliminated, a bit more than two months earlier than the date envisaged by the treaty.

Commenting on this event, the Italian press calls it historic. And at a press conference, American military men noted that the complete fulfillment of the treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union will permit the the destruction of a whole class of weapons from the American and Soviet arsenals. Our country has assumed the obligation to destroy its SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5 missiles.

Millions of pacifists in many countries of the world demanded the removal of American cruise missiles from Sicily and from other NATO bases and their elimination. Now, when the base at Comiso is empty, Italian military commanders are not inclined, judging from their first statements, to dismantle it. The local population is demanding that the base be turned into a civilian facility.

### **CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE**

#### **Transcaucasus Military District Disarmament Department Formed**

91WC0077A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 5 Mar 91 First Edition p 2

[Report by Sakinform—TASS correspondents Major B. Kononenko and V. Golovin: "Disarmament Department"]



[Text] A new department dealing with disarmament issues has been formed in the Transcaucasus Military District. As in other districts also, incidentally. This was done in accordance with the signing by the leaders of the 22 countries representing the Warsaw Pact and NATO of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe on 19 November last year in Paris and the impending ratification of this important document. The work the department will perform was described by its chief, Colonel V. Zorin:

"By our activity we are to ensure realization of the treaty and create all the conditions stipulated for its consistent implementation. We will monitor the movement of military equipment and arms both in the district and outside, register the pieces to be destroyed, and support the work of foreign delegations on the territory of the Transcaucasus Military District. Following ratification of the treaty the work of the inspection groups will begin. All this is akin to diplomatic activity. After all, cooperating with the representatives of the 21 countries that signed the treaty, we represent not only the okrug but our entire state also.

"We will necessarily establish the essential contacts with the Councils of Ministers, Foreign and Internal Affairs Ministries, and the KGB of the republics of the Transcaucasus. I am sure that the governments of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan will be attentive to our joint activity. After all, they themselves are raising many of the questions with which we will be dealing."

#### **Charges of Kola Deployments Evading CDE Pact Rejected**

91WC0077B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 7 Mar 91 First Edition p 3

[Article by Colonel B. Tretyakov: "Trust Must Be Mutual"]

[Text] Under conditions of the actual termination of activity of the Warsaw Pact Organization's military structure, particular urgency is attached to safeguarding the security of Europe outside the military bloc framework, when the security of each state is seen as a component of all-European security. A most important instrument of realizing these goals is the common set of mechanisms for confidence-building measures, both those that have already evolved and those that are newly taking shape on the basis of the Paris agreements. And not only a display of good will but also the responsible attitude of each participating state toward implementation of the measures of its military activity are required here.

There has been animated discussion in Norway of late regarding the stimulation of the USSR's military activity on the Kola peninsula which has allegedly been observed. Thus Defense Minister J. Holst declared that the biggest exercise ever conducted in the Soviet-Norwegian border area has been planned for 1991.

Concern over holding the above exercise was expressed by Foreign Minister T. Stoltenberg in an interview on Norwegian radio.

Other statements are being heard also. Their essence amounts to a reanimation of the idea, which had begun to wither away, of the continuation of a "Soviet military threat." In addition, the Soviet Union is being accused of a dangerous buildup of its military power. The corresponding conclusion is being drawn also—the USSR cannot be trusted on military matters.

I would like in this connection to emphasize the following.

As far as the USSR's military activity in North Europe and the adjacent sea areas is concerned, we have not, indeed, conducted large-scale military activities in the Soviet-Norwegian border region since 1968. At the same time, however, three NATO Joint Armed Forces Bar Frost exercises (United States, Britain, Norway, the Netherlands), two Team Work exercises (United States, Britain, the Netherlands, Norway, the FRG, Denmark, Belgium, Canada, Spain, Portugal), two Cold Winter exercises (United States, Britain, Norway, the Netherlands) and others, in each of which from 13,000 to 40,000 men, from 20 to 200 ships, and from 80 to 500 aircraft took part, were conducted on the territory of northern Norway directly adjoining the border with the USSR in 1988-1990 alone.

It is true also that the plans of notifiable military activity of the USSR envisage the organization in 1991 of operational-tactical exercises among the forces of the Leningrad Military District, involving 17,000 men from three motorized infantry divisions. But this does not mean that all the forces involved will be transferred to the Pechenga region. The operations of the motorized infantry divisions will be joined by a common concept, and the training assignments may be carried out in practice within the framework of the current training centers and proving grounds near where the units are permanently based. In accordance with a provision of the Stockholm Conference document, all participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) have been notified of the exercise in good time. Invitations to foreign observers, who will be able to see for themselves the nonthreatening nature of the military activity being performed, will be sent out within the specified timeframe.

At the same time, I consider it necessary to emphasize that the Soviet Union treats with all due responsibility its participation in the process of confidence-building measures in the military sphere. Let us address the facts and at the same time see whether all parties have an appropriate concept of this process.

Commitments were assumed at the 1986 Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building and Security and Disarmament Measures in Europe [CDE] on notification of one's military activity to all the other parties to the CSCE in instances where no fewer than 13,000 men or

300 tanks participated and also where at least 3,000 men took part in an amphibious assault landing or an airborne assault landing. The participants undertook to invite foreign military observers in instances where the numbers of forces participating in the activities amounted to or exceeded 17,000 ground force personnel or 5,000 men in an airdrop or amphibious assault landing. Each participant in the CSCE acquired the right to conduct inspections of military activity on the territory of any other participant in the zone of application of the confidence-building and security measures.

Complying with the agreements that were reached, the Soviet Union has since 1987 notified all states of the organization of 47 measures of military activity (and this number has been declining from year to year here: 18 notifiable exercises were conducted in 1987, 16 in 1988, nine in 1989, and in 1990 only four), to 15 of which observers were invited. In this same period of time, the NATO countries conducted 46 large-scale exercises, at 25 of which observers were present. Inspection groups of the USSR monitored 15 exercises, and NATO groups, 23 (10 on the territory of the USSR, 13 in the groups of forces).

Adhering strictly to the propositions of defensive doctrine and abiding by the letter and spirit of the agreements that have been reached, the Soviet Union has reduced considerably both the number and the scale of its exercises on land, at sea, and in the air. Whereas in 1986 over 40 activities at the operational-tactical level were conducted in the USSR Armed Forces, in 1990 their number declined more than fivefold. In the course of these, no less than 50 percent of the time was allotted to the rehearsal of defense matters, 25 percent to the rehearsal of counterattack operations, and a further 25 to regrouping and transfer.

Previously, depending on the situation, up to 15 submarines and 22 surface ships were on assignment in the Mediterranean; now, it is six or seven warships. In the Indian Ocean, the number of Soviet warships has been reduced from 14-17 to three to five. We have not in recent years been sending our submarines to waters off the West Coast of the United States. We have also undertaken, as of 1990, to give notice of large-scale strategic exercises with the participation of heavy bombers.

The average number of participants in notifiable-level exercises in the USSR is within the 13,000-17,000-man range—one full division with reinforcement assets or two or three understrength divisions with operational-tactical command and control echelon elements. The organization of exercises of this scale emphasizes the Soviet Union's effort to desist from the threatening nature of military activity and a show of force, does not require a large amount of territory, and makes it possible to rehearse in full defensive assignments in the areas of the current proving grounds.

As far, however, as the military activity of the NATO Joint Armed Forces is concerned, even under the conditions of a reduction in the overall number of measures of notifiable military activity, the intensity of the operational and combat training continues, on the whole, at the level of past years and exceeds it even in terms of a number of indicators, which is a consequence of an increase in the scale of the exercises. Thus the average number of personnel participating in each exercise constitutes 26,000-29,000 men, and the number of "mandays" in 1988, for example, compared with 1987 increased from 5.3 million to 7.1 million. Although the number of tanks enlisted in the exercises declined in this period by a factor of more than 1.5, the number of "tank-days" remained almost unchanged—62,000 and 60,500—and the number of aircraft sorties almost doubled.

In addition, the system of operational and combat training of the armies of Western countries has undergone appreciable changes in recent years. A considerable part of the activities is carried out at the battalion-brigade level, which makes it possible to conduct the field training of servicemen, subunits and units at exercises of a non-notifiable level. Command-staff exercises and computer games are conducted at levels from a division up, as a rule, making it possible to rehearse to a sufficient extent questions of the command and control of the groupings of forces that have been created.

It is appropriate to mention that not everyone always has an identical understanding either of such categories as trust and openness upon the exercise of military activity. At the exercises of Soviet forces, the foreign observer guests have an opportunity to familiarize themselves with the operations of the combat formations, units, and subunits upon performance of their set assignments. Such openness enables each of those present to draw objective conclusions concerning the nature of the military activity being conducted and the extent of its possible threat to other states.

At the same time, however, examples of another approach to this matter could also be given. In September 1990 the Norwegian Government invited foreign observers to a stage of the NATO Joint Armed Forces Team Work-90 assault landing exercise. The program provided for observation of an Anglo-Dutch marine brigade assault landing. But the observers were not accorded an opportunity to see the operations of the combat units, despite the requests of the guests and even an official protest on the part of the Swiss representative. And this was not the sole example of such "openness." The concept of the exercises and the assignments of the forces taking part are concealed, as a rule, from the observers at the NATO Joint Armed Forces exercises, and the demonstration of practical operations is confined to showing small technical and rear support and maintenance subunits.

Mention should also be made of the fact that confidence-building and supervisory measures have yet to encompass either military activity on the territory of the United States and Canada or the activity of the air and naval forces, that is, the components of the armed forces in respect of which the United States and NATO, as a whole, have considerable superiority to the USSR.

None of this can fail to prompt certain thoughts and conclusions. Trust must be mutual. It could become such if all participants in the all-European process were to scrupulously comply with the agreements concerning the military sphere. And if the confidence-building and supervisory measures were to extend to all aspects of the military activity of each state without exception.

### **Further on Troop Pullout From Hungary**

#### **Talks Continue**

*LD1303132191 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1856 GMT 12 Mar 91*

[By TASS correspondent Sergey Zhirnikhin]

[Text] Budapest 12 March (TASS)—USSR representatives responsible for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, Lieutenant General V. Ye. Shilov and I. P. Aboimov, USSR Ambassador to the Hungarian Republic, today visited Hungarian Prime Minister Josef Antall. During the meeting matters relating to the implementation of the troop withdrawal schedule were discussed. They also discussed unresolved property, financial, and economic problems, the settlement of which is envisaged by the Soviet-Hungarian intergovernmental agreement of 10 March 1990. It was agreed that the necessary measures will be taken to achieve mutually acceptable solutions as soon as possible.

#### **Soviet Ambassador Comments**

*AU2203094891 Budapest MTI in English 1402 GMT 21 Mar 91*

[Text] Budapest, 21 March (MTI)—The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary is proceeding according to schedule, in compliance with the inter-governmental agreement.

More than 75 percent of all personnel, 90 percent of all tanks, 87 percent of all artillery, all military helicopters and 45 percent of all planes have already been withdrawn, the Thursday issue of the daily MAGYAR HIRLAP reported in an interview with the Soviet Ambassador to Budapest Ivan Aboimov.

As regards matters still to be resolved related to the troop withdrawals, Aboimov said:

"There are still some financial problems. We have built lots of flats, schools, health care institutions, and other buildings at our own expense at places where Soviet troops were stationed. These buildings are to remain here and will become the property of the Hungarian

authorities. We consider it a just claim to receive some kind of compensation for them. It is, however, only natural that the Soviet side will pay due attention to Hungarian needs as well.

"Unfortunately, there has still been no progress in this respect within our talks. I do not wish to go into the details as regards to the reasons why, but I think the chances are we will not be able to settle financial problems by the time the troop withdrawals have been completed.

"At the same time, we must be aware that in case there still are unsettled financial problems by the time the troop withdrawals have been completed, forcing one of the sides to take unilateral steps, this will have an unfavourable effect on Soviet-Hungarian relations."

Speaking about Soviet-Hungarian ties, Aboimov stated:

"Due to several reasons, we still have to cooperate closely because whatever changes come about in our two countries, there are basic objective factors that link us together."

### **Military CSBM Inspectors Arrive in Norway 12 Mar**

*LD1303052491 Moscow TASS in English 0500 GMT 13 Mar 91*

[Text] Moscow, March 13 (TASS)—Under the provisions of the 1990 Vienna document of the talks on confidence- and security-building measures [CSBM] and cooperation in Europe, the Soviet Government applied to the Government of Norway on March 11 in a request for an inspection of military activities on Norwegian territory, it was officially announced here today.

Following a positive reply to the request, a group of Soviet military inspectors arrived in Norway on March 12 and began a tour of inspection.

### **FRG's Genscher Discusses CFE Reductions With Bessmertnykh**

*LD1803111391 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 1000 GMT 18 Mar 91*

[Text] TASS correspondents have just reported: At the second round of talks between Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, and Hans-Dietrich Genscher, which have ended, problems of arms limitation were discussed.

A TASS correspondent was told by Vitaliy Churkin, representative of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that among other things issues connected with the treaty on armed forces reduction in Europe were discussed in detail with the participation of experts, as were several problems of bilateral relations between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany.

**'Definite Progress' in Vienna CSBM Talks**

*LD2003211891 Moscow TASS International Service  
in Russian 1224 GMT 20 Mar 91*

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov]

[Text] Vienna, 20 March (TASS)—Definite progress has been achieved in virtually all areas of talks on confidence- and security-building measures [CSBM] in Europe. That description could be applied to the results of the second session of the new stage of this forum, which ended here today and in which the 34 CSCE states participated. The first stage ended just before the Paris summit last November.

An important result of the current session was the adoption of a document on exchanging information on military forces and plans to deploy basic systems of weapons and equipment. It is intended to safeguard "glasnost" in the process of strengthening confidence and security on the continent. It is significant that this so-called format, which covers all European countries, embraces not only weapons but also military personnel. Furthermore, despite certain difficulties, practical work to prepare a seminar on military doctrines has begun. The significance of this is particularly great in conditions where many states are rethinking military doctrines in view of the realities of the modern age.

A good deal of work was done at the last session for the practical implementation of the project for a CSCE communications network which is to supplement diplomatic channels. Although its development is lagging a little behind schedule, it has nevertheless been possible to refine the technical nature of the communications and a number of other questions.

In the opinion of Oleg Grinveskiy, the head of the Soviet delegation to the talks, the next stage is to seriously promote the concept of such confidence and security-building measures that would correspond to the change that has taken place in European political life and in the military and political situation on the continent. These measures in the framework of the confidence-security-disarmament triangle should cover completely new areas, with the aim not only of completing the dismantling of confrontational structures, but of really creating an irreversible level of trust, he said in conversation with a TASS correspondent. It is important that these measures should cover naval and air forces, and that the scale and intensity of military activity should be limited, he went on. The Soviet delegation has raised this question. It drew the attention of the participants in the talks to the fact that at a time when there are radical cuts in conventional weapons, the naval factor takes on a character that as a result of its significance can no longer remain outside the sphere of openness. Unfortunately, these proposals still remain without a constructive answer, although we propose so far confining ourselves to the simplest measures of trust, the Soviet diplomat added.

**Comments on Fifth Round of Troop Withdrawal Talks With Poland**

**Polish Diplomat Comments**

*LD2103103891 Warsaw PAP in English 2302 GMT  
20 Mar 91*

[Text] Moscow, March 20—Deputy Director of the Foreign Ministry's department and head of the Polish delegation Grzegorz Kostrzewa-Zorbas deemed talks on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland and the transit of the Western Group of Soviet Troops from Germany serious, creative and held in a very good atmosphere. The 5th round of talks, lasting two days, ended here today.

The Polish diplomat said that the talks concerned primarily the problem of transit because as regards the withdrawal of the Northern Group of Soviet Troops from Poland basically only the dates of starting and completing this operation remained to be agreed. Final decisions will be made during a meeting of the Polish and Soviet presidents to be held in the second half of April. Kostrzewa-Zorbas stressed that it was not the task of the delegations to accomplish a breakthrough in this question, although they exchanged new proposals and arguments.

The Polish representative said that 80 percent of the treaty on transit had already been agreed on and the remaining differences of opinion have, as he termed it, technical rather than political character.

During the present round of talks, both sides reached final agreement on railway fares that would compensate for all costs to be borne by the Polish side. These fares are based on rates accepted in Europe and calculated in Swiss francs. Kostrzewa-Zorbas observed that Poland neither wanted to make a profit on the transit nor could it lose on this burdensome operation. He recalled that both sides had given up road transit deeming it to be the most burdensome and difficult to organize.

The next round of talks will be held in Warsaw in the first half of April.

**'Definite Progress' Seen Achieved**

*91UM0497A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 22 Mar 91 First Edition p 3*

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel V. Nikanorov: "Problems Remain"]

[Text] The fifth round of Soviet-Polish negotiations on conditions for the stay and withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Polish Republic, and also the transit of the Western Group of Forces through Polish territory, has ended in Moscow.

These negotiations, in which the representatives of the concerned departments of both countries are taking part, have been taking place since November of last year in the



Polish and Soviet capitals alternately. The last four rounds did not bring appreciable successes. The Polish side put forth very strict requirements on the dates of the withdrawal of the Northern Group of forces—by the end of this year, which is unacceptable to the Soviet side. In our opinion the payment asked for the transit on Polish railroads and highways of operational equipment and troops being withdrawn from Germany is excessively high.

How did the fifth round of negotiations, which lasted two days, end? In the opinion of its participants it achieved definite progress, principally on questions concerning problems not related to the withdrawal of the Northern Group of Forces. The problem concerns transit. Quite a few lances were broken in previous rounds over this question. Speaking frankly, the position of the Polish side which, it would seem, did everything to prevent transit, was not entirely clear. This is even stranger if you consider that Polish railroads, as reported in the press, are loaded now to only 40 percent of capacity. Our freight, going from Germany, could provide many in Poland with work, which is a pressing problem now in the face of increasing unemployment in the country. Nonetheless, conditions that are multiplying like mushrooms after a rain, which are actually hindering transit, automatically prompts the thought: But perhaps we should abandon transit through Polish territory entirely? Perhaps there is an argument for organizing shipments through other countries or by sea? Especially since there are calculations that indicate that this could prove to be more economically advantageous for us.

Nevertheless, the sides have come to an agreement in the meantime that there will be no motor vehicle transit through Polish territory—only rail and air. Resolutions have yet to be found on other problems discussed in the negotiations.

"This was a working round," remarked V. Kopteltsev, head of the Soviet delegation. "It must be said that the recent negotiations in Warsaw held by General of the Army M.A. Moiseyev, chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, and Polish leaders helped to move certain important questions forward. Now the sides have already been able to shift to consideration of the details. It is natural that in the process a whole series of new contradictions arise which were not considered earlier. But they, as the saying goes, are of a different scale and another order by comparison with those difficulties that were encountered earlier; that is, they are quite surmountable. General of the Army Moiseyev unequivocally declared in Warsaw that the withdrawal of troops from Polish territory will start within the next few days. The Polish side has become convinced that we are not simply holding on to Polish land, as the saying goes, "out of principle," and that we firmly intend to withdraw our troops. General of the Army Moiseyev explained clearly that our new defensive concept is based on the fact that it is necessary to defend oneself on one's own territory, relying on one's own people, and not try to defend and

protect foreign borders if this is not requested by a given country. I think that the Polish side understood this to be our position. If there were any moments of distrust relative to the intentions of the Soviet Union regarding the fate of the Northern Group of Forces, I think they have now been eliminated.

Thus the fifth round is over. It became a step forward, even though a small one. The laborious work on resolving an intricate complex of problems is continuing.

### Questions Remain

*LD2203151891 Moscow World Service in English  
1210 GMT 22 Mar 91*

[Vadim Solovyev commentary]

[Text] The fifth round of talks between Soviet and Polish military representatives has ended in Moscow. A transit of the Soviet troops leaving Germany and a withdrawal of the Soviet military units from Poland have been discussed. Here is a commentary by our military observer, Vadim Solovyev:

It was expected that if not all the questions at least a considerable number of them would be resolved at the present stage of negotiations on a Soviet withdrawal from Poland. The chief of staff of the Soviet Armed Forces announced before the dialogue in Moscow that it was possible to start withdrawing Soviet troops from Poland already in April or May this year on condition that the Polish authorities stopped hindering the transit of the Soviet military contingent stationed in Germany.

He also said that the Soviet military command intended to remove the western direction headquarters from the Polish territory and suggested that one-fifth of the Soviet troops in Poland return home by the end of the year. It was planned to make a complete withdrawal within three years, and there were reasons to believe that the Polish side would come out with fresh proposals. Unfortunately, many questions have remained unsolved.

The deputy chief of staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, Colonel General Anatoliy Kleymenov, who took part in the talks, said almost [all] the political questions were settled, yet we failed to come to an agreement as to how the transit of Soviet troops from Germany through Polish territory should be paid for. This question as well as another concerning the status of the Soviet military presence in Poland are to be discussed during the next round of talks.

It looks like the issue of the Soviet military withdrawal from Poland is likely to be discussed during the coming visit of the Polish President Lech Walesa to the Soviet Union.



### **No Achievements Seen in Second Round of CFE Talks**

*LD2103175891 Moscow TASS International Service  
in Russian 1030 GMT 21 Mar 91*

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov]

[Text] Vienna, 21 March (TASS)—The second round in the new stage of Vienna talks on conventional armed forces [CFE], which ended here today, ran without achieving anything. On the agenda was the limitation of the number of armed forces personnel of the 22 member states from the Atlantic to the Urals, the formulation of a complex of efficient control measures for stabilization, and an agreement on the procedure for aerial inspection. The forum practically came to a halt.

The working structures for the talks have been preserved, but they were not activated. In the course of the present round, which started on 14 February, there were only three plenary sessions, and between the second and third there was an interval of a month. This time was used for unofficial consultations at the level of heads of delegations and individual experts.

What has happened? The talks have become a hostage to discussions revolving around one of the articles in the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe which was signed at the Paris summit meeting last November, and the matter at stake is the application of the rules for calculating the arms and technology to be reduced. The search for a way of resolving this set of questions was entrusted to a joint consultative group of experts from the 22 states that was working in Vienna. Incidentally, the group was set up for this very purpose in order to free participants in the talks from these concerns. Nevertheless, the problem of this joint consultative group was resolutely put up for discussion during the present round, which as a result, in essence did not take place.

The Soviet delegation considers that it would have been better not to burden the talks with unconstructive polemics, but rather to create normal conditions for the work and then carry it out. In its view, a resolution of the problems can be found. Oleg Grinevskiy, head of the delegation and special ambassador, told a TASS journalist that the USSR for its part is carrying out an intensive search for such solutions. However, it is important that the sort of concern, which can arise, does not turn immediately into a "crisis of confidence." There is no grounds for this. Now the main thing is not to halt efforts to find solutions to this problem, he emphasized.

The next round of talks on conventional armed forces in Europe is to start in mid-April.

### **UK's Hurd Discusses CFE Interpretation With Bessmertnykh**

*LD2103193691 Moscow TASS in English 1555 GMT  
21 Mar 91*

[By TASS correspondents Aleksandr Kanishchev and Igor Peskov]

[Excerpts] Moscow, March 21 (TASS)—Douglas Hurd, British secretary of state for foreign and commonwealth affairs, addressed a news conference here today, held after his meeting with President Gorbachev. He said that his conversation with Gorbachev had been focused almost totally on domestic problems. [passage omitted]

Douglas Hurd, who is staying in the Soviet Union on a working visit, had conversations today with President Mikhail Gorbachev, Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh and Chairman of the Russian legislature Boris Yeltsin.

Hurd said at the news conference that he was very much satisfied with his visit. He pointed out that he had discussed with Bessmertnykh the efforts that the Soviet Union and Western countries should exert together with regard to the Gulf problem. According to Hurd, during the discussion of that problem tactical differences had emerged from time to time, but on the whole the discussion had been fruitful. The sides also discussed the Arab-Israeli problem, problems dealing with disarmament, specifically those dealing with the agreement on conventional armaments, as well as many other European problems. [passage omitted]

Responding to the question about the lack of symmetry, created in Europe because of the termination of existence of the Warsaw Pact military organisation, Hurd said that he had not discussed this problem here in Moscow. At the same time, he pointed out that NATO would be preserved. NATO member countries decided, first, to change NATO and, second, to preserve this organisation. The transformation process is now being worked out within the NATO framework. Hurd said that he had discussed it in detail with Aleksandr Bessmertnykh. It was part of the discussion which is under way in Western countries and the West European Union. NATO is revising its functions, he added. Of course, NATO member states plan to preserve the level of armaments and the strength of troops. The U.S. and Canadian presence, the allied command of nuclear and conventional armaments, that form the basis of NATO, will be preserved. NATO membership will not be expanded. [passage omitted]

Commenting on his conversation with Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, Hurd said that, by all appearances, it would be easy to establish effective working relations with his Soviet counterpart. He knows all problems, arguments and their history, he pointed out. Hurd and Bessmertnykh decided to keep in touch by telephone.

Speaking about the arms control treaty, Hurd pointed out that although there remained some questions to which answers were not yet found, he was not pessimistic about it. At [word indistinct] time, he said that tremendous progress had been achieved in Moscow on human rights issues.

Hurd said that during his talks with Bessmertnykh they had discussed in detail the differences that had emerged in connection with the interpretation of the third article of the treaty on the reduction of conventional armaments in Europe. He pointed out that this problem could not be settled on a bilateral level by the USSR and one of the signatories to the treaty. Hurd believes that it should be settled by all those who signed the treaty.

Pointing to a different interpretation of the third article by the Soviet Union and Britain, Hurd said at the same time that the two sides had some ideas on possible ways of overcoming the differences. They agreed to work together for achieving it as soon as possible. [passage omitted]

#### **Churkin Interviewed on FRG Troop Withdrawals**

*LD2203132891 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 0530 GMT 22 Mar 91*

[Text] Now we turn to an important subject. Today at the USSR Supreme Soviet discussion will be continued on the treaty between our country and the FRG on the conditions of the temporary sojourn and planned withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of Germany, as well as on the agreement on some transitional measures. In this connection, our diplomatic correspondent, Viktor Levin, asked Vitaliy Churkin, head of the Information Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to answer a number of questions. Here is a recording of their conversation:

[Begin recording] [Levin] Vitaliy Ivanovich, I happened to hear that the Soviet Union, not only in drawing up this specific treaty on the conditions of the temporary sojourn and planned withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of Germany, but also in other accords with Germany as well, accepted the German conditions virtually to the detriment of its own interests. What is your opinion?

[Churkin] Such assertions evoke bewilderment in me. I do not know what calls them forth—either a lack of knowledge of the subject or ill intention. Here is it probably a case of enmity in general to the perestroika foreign policy of the Soviet Union. This is probably also a particular case of the assertions that one hears about all the Soviet Union has done is to make one-sided concessions to the West over the last few years, in the years of perestroika. But then the question arises of how we, as a result of the endless chain of unilateral concessions, have managed to create a situation in which, in spite of the extreme difficulty of the international situation in the country, we have an extremely favorable atmosphere surrounding us on the outside. We have a situation in

which the countries and peoples surrounding us—that same West—are striving to assist us to achieve the goals that we have set for our country. We have moved away from the dogmatic ideas of the past, which led both our foreign policy and our country in general into an impasse from which no way out could be seen until April 1985.

Returning to your specific question about the alleged unconditional concessions to the German side, I can simply say that the Soviet minister of foreign affairs had to meet Genscher, FRG minister of foreign affairs, 14 or 15 times. I do not remember the exact number. They met last year and held many long hours of exhausting conversations. Why was it necessary for our president and Chancellor Kohl to sit for hours at Wachlisse discussing details and questions relating to the relations between our countries? Surely it was not in order to agree to all the German conditions. Naturally, this is not the case. It is a question of a radical turning point in our relations with Germany. At issue here is the fact that we created the foundation for our relations with that country to be the basis of a stable European order and the further fruitful developments of cooperation between the Soviet and German people's in many spheres.

Speaking about and being even more specific about the questions of the treaty on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of Germany, I would like to note the following: Yes, indeed, by the end of 1994 Soviet troops will be withdrawn from the territory of Germany, from the territory of the former GDR. Military men note that, from a strategic point of view, their presence there has to considerable extent, if not fully, ceased to make sense in connection with the fact that our troops are being withdrawn from the territory of other countries in Eastern Europe, in connection with the fact that from 1 April the military organization of the Warsaw Pact will no longer exist. Therefore, from that point of view, the more swiftly we withdraw the troops from the territory of the former GDR and can completely concentrate on ensuring the defense capability of our country, the better.

As a result of those treaties, this treaty and the agreement on several transitional measures that also have to be ratified in the Supreme Soviet, the German side is rendering financial support, both for the sojourn of Soviet troops on the territory of Germany for a period of almost four years, as well as regarding the withdrawal to the territory of the Soviet Union. I would like to note that the financial problem here is very great. You see, at issue here are 500,000 Soviet citizens—soldiers, officers, and the members of their families. At present, hard currency has to be spent on their upkeep. I have to say that the German side is meeting us halfway here. Before these agreements come into force, before they are ratified, the German side is giving us this financial support, as an advance payment as it were. In principle, it need not do that.

[Levin] The maintenance is fairly impressive, a sum of 13 billion German marks.

[Churkin] At present, the situation is something of paradox. We have already ratified the treaties giving Germany complete sovereignty, in which it is envisaged that Germany's rights will be fully restored, but for the moment we have not ratified those agreements according to which we will receive money from Germany. The Germans are saying: When will you ratify those agreements so we can start building houses for the members of your servicemen's families in accordance with these agreements? There is a whole complex of related issues in which we are greatly interested.

[Levin] The detractors of the treaty on the conditions of Soviet troops' stay in and planned withdrawal from German territory also mention that it contains an absolutely unprecedented demand for Soviet troops to put the occupied territory in order.

[Churkin] First of all, I must say that the treaty has no clause whatsoever containing any demands of this kind on our troops that are leaving the territory of the former GDR. Second, I would like to draw your attention to the significant, strange comments about occupied territory being made by Soviet people. This is a certain rehash of statements by those Western voices that are far from friendly to us and that assert that the Soviet Army on the territory of East European countries is an occupational Army. As regards the GDR, I would like to recall that our troops were occupational only from 1945 to 1949. After the GDR was formed in 1949, their status changed and the new status was confirmed by the accords we signed with the GDR in 1957. Since then our troops were officially temporary stationed on the territory of the GDR, a state that was friendly to us. This is not a question of a territory occupied by Soviet troops and which the Soviet troops are now leaving. I would like to note that, in my view, certain critics complain not so much about the accords signed with Germany last year as about the entire postwar process of settlement with Germany. For example, the issue of reparations was solved long ago. It was solved in the process of our contacts with the GDR as early as the 1950's. Therefore, it is senseless to return to all those issues now. Now we have to solve this entire package of most complex problems not on the basis of the situation that existed in 1945 when we came to Germany as a conquering power, but taking into account the reality after that in our relations with the GDR. For example, now we have to solve—and one must mention that we continue to discuss this with the German side; specifically, this was discussed in conversations with Genscher in Moscow the other day—we have to solve the issue of the property our troops will leave on German territory when withdrawing, and the issue of selling this property. But the problem also consists of the fact that some structures belonging to our troops are situated on the territory of the former GDR. That land does not belong to us in accordance with the agreements we concluded with the GDR several decades ago. How can you sell a house or bargain about it if it stands on a plot of land that does not belong to you? [end recording]

### Ladygin Describes Ongoing Soviet Arms Cuts

LD2603161291 Moscow TASS in English 1547 GMT  
26 Mar 91

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Moscow, March 26 (TASS)—“The Soviet military reform that is being implemented envisages the further reduction of the armed forces, their numerical strength and main systems of arms”, General Fedor Ladygin, chief of the Legal Agency of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, told TASS. He gave an interview today in connection with the planned reduction of U.S. armed forces announced by U.S. Defence Secretary Robert Cheney.

“The intentions of the U.S. side are assessed in the USSR as positive, although this step was expected to be taken much sooner”, Ladygin said.

He noted that the Soviet Union's unilateral decisions on the reduction of USSR armed forces, adopted in 1988, have already resulted in the disbandment of the agencies of two military districts, of four all-arms and one rocketry armies, of five army corps, five rocketry divisions, four divisions of anti-aircraft forces. As many as 38 armoured and motorised rifle divisions have been reduced. The reductions applied to 27 rocketry regiments, two large air units of military districts, two air divisions, six anti-aircraft rocketry brigades and a number of other units.

As a result of these reductions the numerical strength of the USSR armed forces reduced by over 460,000 servicemen as compared with the numerical strength in 1988. He added that in European part of the USSR and Army units the number of tanks decreased by 20.5 thousand of armoured vehicles by 19.3 thousand, artillery systems by 28.4 thousand and military aircraft by 1,950.

“A total of 26 submarines and 45 surface ships and launches were withdrawn from service and scrapped in the Navy,” the general said.

Ladygin noted that the military organisation of the Warsaw Treaty will be dissolved before March 31, 1991 and that the Soviet Union will complete troop withdrawals from Czechoslovakia and Hungary by July 1, 1991. “Soviet troop withdrawal from Germany continues and troop withdrawal from Poland begins this year,” he said.

Ladygin believes that a new military-political situation has formed in Europe. “Any plans and, the main thing, practical steps by the United States and its NATO allies in the reduction of their military potentials could help create new structures of collective security in Europe”, Ladygin said.

**Troop Withdrawal From CSFR Ahead of Schedule***LD2603135291 Moscow TASS International Service  
in Russian 0918 GMT 26 Mar 91*

[By TASS correspondent Igor Shamshin]

[Excerpts] Prague, 26 March (TASS)—The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia will be completed by 20 May 1991, which is a month and a half prior to the agreed time—30 June 1991. [passage omitted]

Col.-Gen. E.A. Vorobyev told Czech legislators that all types of ammunition, including nuclear, have been transported out of the Central Group of Forces depots. In connection with this, he confirmed that "Soviet troops never had and do not have chemical weapons here." Representatives of Soviet and Czech military command assured deputies of the legislature that all issues of ownership and finances linked to the handover of depots will be resolved without delay.

**NUCLEAR TESTING****Nuclear Test Consultations Held With Finns***PM0703104991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
2 Mar 91 Moscow Edition p 4*

[TASS report under general heading: "Official Reports"]

[Text] On 28 February Soviet-Finnish talks were held in Moscow on questions of ensuring safety during underground nuclear tests on the northern testing range (Novaya Zemlya island).

**CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS****USSR Accused of Dumping Chemical Weapons in Baltic***LD1903164191 Vilnius International Service  
in English 2300 GMT 18 Mar 91*

[Report on remarks by (Ricardas Baubinas), deputy head of the Institute of Geography and vice president of the Lithuanian Geographic Society, in studio on 18 March]

[Text] At the beginning of March the Lithuanian Geographic Society, in collaboration with the Institute of Geography of the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences, informed the government and the public at large of the existence of a chemical weapons burial site in the Baltic Sea. We invited (Ricardas Baubinas), to our studio today to provide us with more details on this truly alarming discovery. (Ricardas Baubinas):

Last October the Soviet daily IZVESTIYA carried a brief article about the surprising discovery of a burial site of chemical weapons dating back to the Second World War by a Swedish scientist who was investigating the Baltic Sea. The burial site was located not far from the Swedish coast. The same article pointed out that it remained

unclear who had dumped the chemical weapons there. The appearance of third-rank [USSR] Captain (Terskov) on the scene brought an unexpected denouement to the story.

Mr. (Terskov) admitted in a newspaper article several months later that he had personally supervised the dumping of the chemical weapons which had been accumulated on German territory during the years of the Second World War, and following the decision of the Soviet Government in 1947, they were buried in the Baltic Sea. The retired captain also stated that two sites had been chosen for the dumping of the chemical weapons. One of them being 56 miles southwest of the Latvian port Liepaja. This latter detail aroused both enormous interest and concern in this country, since that particular site belongs to Lithuanian territorial waters and is estimated to lie 50 to 60 km west of the popular Lithuanian seaside resort, Palanga.

Since Capt. (Terskov) maintains that 5,000 chemical explosives were dumped in that particular site, we believe it is our duty to inform both our government and the public at large. After all, with a certain part of the Baltic Sea falling under the jurisdiction of the Republic of Lithuania, it simply cannot undertake the responsibility for the possible consequences of such dangerous activities perpetrated by other states. And we believe that the consequences can be very grave indeed since the chemical explosives are gradually eroding with new chemical compounds forming in the process. Besides, their field of dispersion is constantly expanding.

We possess undeniable evidence that the men who loaded the ships in these explosives prior to their burial, as well as fishermen of the island of Bornholm, suffered from acute poisoning.

Exactly 10 years ago a major ecological crisis, perhaps the largest in the Baltic Sea area, took place just off the Lithuanian coast when a tanker split in half during a raging storm, spilling a total of 16,000 tonnes of black oil into the sea. The damage incurred in terms of money was enormous, but worst of all, the balance of the Baltic ecosystem was severely affected, its consequences being felt even today. Asked to compare the consequences caused by the tanker to the threat posed by the dumped chemical weapons, (Ricardas Baubinas) said:

It is indeed a difficult task to give an unequivocal answer to this question due to lack of information. I would like to point out with regret that the Soviet Union has carefully concealed the fact that it had dumped chemical weapons in the Baltic Sea. In (?aquatic) maps there was only a sign indicating the presence of weapon burial sites in the Baltic Sea. The danger of ordinary explosives simply cannot be compared to the threat posed by chemical explosives. Furthermore, we have absolutely no knowledge as to the chemical substances used in the explosives, their projected dispersion on the seabed, or the characteristics of the seabed in that particular area.



That is why we cannot give a concrete answer to this question or to draw comparisons with other major ecological disasters.

In addition to the ecological aspect of this threat, we single out a political aspect as well. After all, if the Soviet Union agrees that a certain part of the Baltic Sea is to be attributed to the Republic of Lithuania, it should not only provide it with such vital information, but also take real action in order that Lithuania not be held responsible for previous Soviet actions in this particular area.

The official statement released jointly by the Institute of Geography and the Lithuanian Geographic Society reads:

Quote, it is essential to get the Soviet Union to scrap all the dumped explosives and chemical material from Lithuanian territorial waters in the Baltic Sea. Should the Soviet Union itself be unable to fulfil this demand, it must make use of the services rendered by competent foreign firms, unquote.

In the opinion of (Ricardas Baubinas), Lithuania could hardly cope with this unprecedented problem alone:

Of course, we ourselves will not be able to conduct the necessary investigations. We saw our main aim, however, in informing the Lithuanian Government and public about this dangerous situation and demanding appropriate information from the Soviet leadership. I am more than sure that the Institute of Geography of the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences could play a positive

role in the investigations. That would undoubtedly (?ensue) since it has acquired a wealth of facts about the Baltic Sea over the past 40 years.

As to specific recommendations about the removal of the chemical weapons, I think this can be done only by a group of highly skilled and competent firms or organizations. Even at this point I realize well that such a project requires enormous financial investments, thus it is clear that it will be brought to fruition only if all the Baltic Sea basin countries cooperate. This is but natural since a dangerous threat looms over the entire Baltic Sea area.

Following the publication of this information which had been meticulously concealed from the public at large, it was natural to expect some kind of reaction. So our last question to (Ricardas Baubinas) was what kind of reaction does this alarming news set off? (Ricardas Baubinas):

As far as we know, the reaction was very matter of fact. The Lithuanian cabinet launched an investigation into our statement and took steps to obtain additional information. I've also heard that it sent a special letter to the Soviet Government requiring more details about the entire affair. I think that at present this is the most that we could have done.

(Ricardas Baubinas), deputy director of the Institute of Geography of the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences and vice president of the Lithuanian Geographic Society, speaking about the stockpiles of dumped chemical weapons not far from the Lithuanian coast.



## GERMANY

### Genscher Comments on Talks on CFE With Soviets

LD1903110391 Berlin ADN in German 0911 GMT  
19 Mar 91

[Text] Bonn (ADN)—Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher is convinced that "certain problems" concerning the application of the conventional disarmament treaty can be overcome and that the treaty will be ratified by the Soviet Union. After his return from Moscow Genscher said on Deutschlandfunk radio today that he agrees with USSR President Gorbachev on that issue. "It is urgently necessary for the future of Europe and is of particularly great importance for us Germans," the foreign minister emphasized.

The ratification process of the two-plus-four treaty was by no means without problems. "Nobody should have any illusions, for there are, obviously, forces in the Soviet Union who did not like to see German unification, who do not like to see Soviet Armed Forces leaving Germany, and that united Germany will remain in the western alliance." However, change is also in the interest of the Soviet Union.

Asked about the transfer of Honecker, Genscher said that the Soviet leadership had again learned directly "how we assess and judge this case in view of our constitutional order. I think that it will be properly evaluated." However, Genscher refused to forecast whether Honecker will return to Germany. "That will surely depend upon his state of health."

### Israelis Confirm Germans Did Not Improve Scuds

LD2003231191 Hamburg DPA in German 1756 GMT  
20 Mar 91

[Text] Hamburg (DPA)—According to Federal Minister of Economy Juergen Moellmann (FDP) [Free Democratic Party], the Israeli intelligence service has confirmed that the range of the Iraqi Scud missiles was not extended with the help of the Germans. Moellmann said to the daily newspaper DIE WELT (tomorrow's edition): "The Israeli account is certainly not a general certificate of blamelessness, but it shows that one does not have to believe every criticism," the minister said. During the Gulf war, German enterprises were suspected of having broken the embargo against Iraq.

The interview was given to DPA in an edited version.

### Soviet Forces Withdrawal Figures Reported

LD2003233291 Hamburg DPA in German 1631 GMT  
20 Mar 91

[Text] Potsdam (DPA)—The Soviet Group of Western Forces removed around 53,000 tonnes of ammunition from Germany in the first two months of this year. It was transported by a total of 223 trains and 8,230 vehicles,

Brandenburg Land Government's Helmut Domke announced in Potsdam today.

A total of 800 tracked vehicles, some 2,000 motor vehicles, and 36,000 tonnes each of ammunition and materials were shipped via Rostock, Wismar, and Mukran. Around 1,300 tracked vehicles and motor vehicles and a total of 14,000 tonnes of ammunition and materials were transported via Poland.

Domke said the withdrawal of the forces will be largely completed by 1992 in the south of eastern Germany, by 1993 in the north, and by the end of 1994 in the central region. In 1991 just under 150,000 people, representing 27 percent of all Soviet citizens in eastern Germany, will be withdrawn from a total of 121 locations, mainly in Brandenburg, Saxony-Anhalt, and Thuringia.

### Arms Control Verification Committee Organized

LD2003230291 Berlin ADN in German 1508 GMT  
20 Mar 91

[Text] Bonn (ADN)—The Verification Control Committee, which will set out the bases for implementing the FRG arms control policy agreements, constituted itself in Bonn on Wednesday. As the Foreign Ministry announced, the committee is chaired by Ambassador Josef Holik, the government's commissioner for disarmament and arms control.

The work of the committee, the Foreign Ministry said, will be to help the joint preparation of the relevant government departments, the Foreign Ministry, and the Ministry of Defense, for the complex tasks arising from implementing the comprehensive and completely novel verification regime of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). At its first session, the committee laid down the guidelines for on-site inspections under the provisions of the CFE treaty, which was signed in Paris on 19 November 1990.

### Arms Exports Control Regulations Tightened

AU2303165591 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER  
ALLGEMEINE in German 23 Mar 91 p 1

[Report by "K.B.": "The Export of Weapons-Grade Products Will in the Future Be Controlled More Strictly"]

[Text] Bonn, 22 March—With a quarrel about the curtailment of the secrecy of mail and telecommunications, the Bundestag on Friday adopted tighter regulations on the control and punishment of illegal arms exports. The draft law on amendments to the Foreign Trade and Payments Law and the Code of Criminal Procedure was passed by a majority of the coalition parties. However, some Free Democratic Party (FDP) deputies and the opposition voted against the laws.

In order to preventively combat illegal exports and services of German citizens for arms production in crisis areas, the majority of the coalition considers it necessary

to authorize the Customs Institute of Criminal Investigation to monitor telephone conversations, with certain safeguards, as has now been decided. Christian Democratic Union (CDU) deputies Horst Eylmann and Rudolf Sprung defended this regulation by arguing that the control of illegal exports must begin at the point when there are indications that violations of the Foreign Trade and Payments Law and the Weapons Control Law are planned and/or attempted. They said that, in addition, the efficiency of exports controls also depends essentially on whether such controls are coordinated internationally, at least within the EC. Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) deputies Hermann Bachmaier and Otto Schily, on the other hand, criticized the new regulation as an irresponsible and indefensible encroachment on the secrecy of mail and telecommunications, by which many citizens could be affected who are not involved in illegal exports. "We do not need to have a control state to combat illegal exports; a state ruled by the law is enough," said Bachmaier.

Federal Economics Minister Juergen Moelleman, FDP, defended the tightening of controls and punishments generally as an opportunity to prosecute illegal acts in the foreign trade and payments area more strictly. He said that despite the possibility of monitoring telephone conversations and the mail, the protection of the private sphere continued to be a constitutional law. However, Bachmaier called for other binding regulations that do not represent constitutionally questionable encroachments. He said that it must be laid down by law that foreign trade checks must be carried out if there is a suspicion of illegal acts. Whoever has information about violations must be committed to report them, he said. He added that employees who report such events in their company have to be specially protected. Bachmaier accepts the monitoring of telephone conversations on the basis of the Code of Criminal Procedure if there is a "concrete suspicion" of illegal acts. The SPD continues to consider it of decisive importance that arms exports to countries outside NATO be generally prohibited. Regarding Economics Minister Moelleman's announcement that the Economics Ministry will submit a government report on the incidents in Iraq, the Alliance 90/Greens says that the Federal Government considers the report secret. The group says that the government report must be presented to parliament, as was the case with the Al-Rabitah report.

#### **Daimler-Benz Said To Supply Mobile Missile Launchers to Iraq**

AU2603122291 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German  
25 Mar 91 pp 130-132

[Unattributed report: "The Secret of the Apartments"]

[Excerpts] Suspicion is increasing that Daimler-Benz was involved in shady dealings. The public prosecutors discovered two apartments where company files were stored. The Federal Intelligence Service gave hints to the

Bonn government as early as January that Iraqi surface-to-surface missiles were transported on Mercedes trucks. [passage omitted]

These events are certainly distressing for the head of the Daimler concern, Edzard Reuter. Accusations that senior officials enriched themselves are unpleasant enough for the moralist Reuter. However, the suspicion that the concern illegally exported trucks, which is being investigated by the Public Prosecutor's Office, is probably really painful for him.

"We have supplied no armored trucks to anybody, only normal trucks for civilian purposes," Reuter stressed. This statement, however, is very dubious.

Legal proceedings have been initiated against the Mercedes partner Marrel. It might now be extended to the Stuttgart-based Mercedes concern, because Mercedes is the general contractor.

According to its own statements, the company delivered 26 vehicles, type MB 3336/A, to Iraq until the middle of July 1990. Mercedes built the tractor trucks, and Marrel, a subsidiary of the French Bennes Marrel concern, produced flat-bed tractor trailers with special equipment, including hydraulic devices.

The investigators suspect that the heavy-duty vehicles were destined to be used as mobile launching platforms for Scud-B missiles in Iraq.

According to official information, the vehicles were to be used for the transportation of crane retrievers. No export permit was required because of the planned civilian use. Company spokesman Matthias Kleinert stressed that it was also possible to transport carrots, and that it was not possible to bring Scuds into position.

Important details of the contract speak against Kleinert's version. The documents seized at the Marrel company contain numerous references to Project 144—the code for the Scud-B program.

On 30 June 1989 the contract covering the trucks was concluded between Mercedes and the "State Organization for Technical Industry" (SOTI), which is a department of the war ministry in Baghdad.

Last week new details of the deal became known. According to these findings, the Iraqi company Technical Corporation for Special Projects (Teco) was involved. Teco is headed by Husayn Karmil, minister of military industrialization and Saddam Husayn's son-in-law.

Karmil was in charge of all major military projects in the country, including the development of the supergun and the Scud Program 144.

The contracts concluded by Mercedes contain the term "noncivilian version" at various points. All tractor trucks are fitted with "sleuable roof opening" on the side of the co-driver.

This means something to experts. For years the war ministry in Baghdad ordered sand-colored trucks with roof openings for submachine guns. The 26 Mercedes-Marrel vehicles were also ordered with "special matte sand-colored coating."

According to the Daimler managers, the roof opening cannot be seen as proof of the military use of the trucks. Round holes are also cut into civilian vehicles. For submachine gun stands the roof must be more stable than normal roofs. However, this was not the case with the trucks for Iraq.

Even with small details, such as the trailer coupling, the customer from the Middle East accorded great value to the correct equipment. The contract clearly speaks of "military type" equipment.

The secret services discovered some time ago that something was wrong with these deals. On 16 January, the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) drew the government's attention to the exports by the Stuttgart and Wuelfrath companies.

According to a confidential document, Marrel supplied trucks to Iraq "that might be used as launching platforms for surface-to-surface missiles," and which "presumably belong to Project 144," the Scud program. The tractor was produced by Daimler Benz and the flat-bed trailer by Marrel, the intelligence agents claimed.

One can proceed from the assumption that the final destination of the vehicles was covered up, "despite the fact that those involved must have known about the actual use."

Despite the clear references to the military version and the transportation of Scud-B missiles, the investigators might be facing difficulties. On the basis of the lax German laws, the prosecuting authority must now prove that the vehicles were constructed especially for military use in Iraq. References in contracts and drawings might not be sufficient.

However, the Iraqi deals and exports by the Mercedes concern to other Arab states might not be compatible with Reuter's noble principles.

The public prosecutors are investigating three export deals of the Stuttgart-based company, which are believed to have been carried without export permits. Thus, 85 3250-AS-type trucks were allegedly delivered to Kuwait, 150 3850-AS-type trucks to Abu Dhabi, and 70 trucks of the same type to Yemen.

Nobody will believe the arguments of the Mercedes managers that simple transport vehicles, suited for the transportation of harmless goods, were involved. The investigators are in the possession of a brochure ("Mercedes-Benz Military Vehicles"), in which the range of military products is described in detail.

The standard Mercedes vehicles "have been modified for military purposes," the leaflet reads. It is exactly the

models that Mercedes exported to Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen that are presented in the brochure as "Mercedes-Benz military vehicles."

There are numerous innuendos and accusations. At the moment, the investigators are busy emptying the crates with the confiscated files and examining the material. However, the suspicion—violation of the arms export law by the company, the illegal pocketing of commissions by individual employees—is a serious burden for the concern and has already damaged the reputation of the Mercedes-Benz automobile concern.

In view of this, the trip that the head of the Mercedes concern, Werner Niefer, made last Thursday [21 March] may have provided some consolation. Over 1,000 managers who were polled last fall by *MANAGER MAGAZINE* rated the auto manufacturer as the number one among the most renowned enterprises of the German industry.

At Hamburg's "Four Seasons" hotel, he received the prize "Image Profiles 91" with a mixture of pride and embarrassment.

## ITALY

### De Michelis To Propose Mediterranean Conference

*AU1403092191 Rome ANSA in English 0823 GMT 14 Mar 91*

[Text] Rome, 14 March (ANSA)—Italian Foreign Minister Gianni de Michelis will formalize early in April a proposal to convene a Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM), it was learned here.

He will send a letter to this effect to the fifteen members of the United Nations Security Council and to the allied coalition partners who operated militarily in the Gulf.

The letter will urge the Security Council to adopt a resolution acknowledging the need for a strong diplomatic initiative to create conditions of peace and stability in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, and will put forward the idea of the CSCM as a fruitful path to explore in this regard.

To better outline his project for a "Mediterranean Helsinki," De Michelis travelled to ten countries over a twelve-day period, meeting with twenty foreign ministers (four Westerners, plus fifteen Arabs and one Israeli), seven heads of state or government, and UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar.

He started out on this mission in Luxembourg on 1 March. From there he continued to London, Washington, New York, Damascus, Jerusalem, Amman, Tripoli, Riyadh, Kuwait, al-Ta'if, Beirut and Cairo, for a total of 51 hours of flight time and covering an average of 3,000 kilometers a day.

The CSCM will be at the center of meetings De Michelis will have in Rome (Tunisia's diplomatic chief is expected here in a few days, and perhaps the Israeli foreign minister, as well), and in trips he will be making abroad in coming weeks.

On March 17 and 18, he will be in Dakar, also in view of a meeting there of the Islamic Conference, of which Senegal is a part.

He will be in Washington 24 March alongside Italian Premier Giulio Andreotti during talks with American leaders.

Following a stopover in Luxembourg, De Michelis will then go on to Tehran and Ankara.

The chief result of the consultations so far, the Italian foreign minister said, has been to more clearly ascertain the diplomatic validity of the CSCM initiative.

However, he stressed that it should not be seen as precluding any other initiative that might be undertaken in the near future to successfully settle the region's myriad problems.

#### **De Michelis's CSCM Initiative Losing Ground**

91P20272A Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian  
14 Mar 91 p 4

[Paolo Galimberti article on Italian Middle East Policy: "De Michelis's Plan Wound Up In a Drawer"]

[Text] When the Gulf war had not yet begun, all politico-diplomatic projects for the post-crisis period seemed equally valid and acceptable because no one could foresee how the conflict would end. Now that the war is over, with an allied victory that is more crushing than foreseen, it is the victors who are dictating the scenarios according to their scale of priority: Above all, the United States, the Arab troika (Saudi Arabia, Syria and Egypt) and, naturally, Israel, a political if not a military victor. This is why Gianni De Michelis's idea of a conference for security and cooperation in the Mediterranean [CSCM], which the foreign minister has tried to "sell" in recent days with a tour of Middle Eastern capitals, has met cold receptions and has been judged premature, complex and even a bit obscure.

De Michelis's proposal, which had initially received a rather warm consensus, had a series of understood assumptions: that Saddam Husayn was defeated but not humiliated after a long and bloody war; that the disinherited Arab masses—from the Israel occupied territories to Jordan, from Egypt to the Maghreb—would rise in a "holy war" invoked by the Iraqi leader; that the winds of war would cause a wave of fundamentalism to rise in the whole vast area that runs from Morocco to Iran, that Israel would see its security so threatened as to feel the need to reach an agreement with the Palestinians, that the inept king of Jordan would be overturned

by "Desert Storm," that the Soviet Union would reacquire a decisive interest in the Middle Eastern area.

#### **An Unforeseen Outcome**

Then, with the conflict over, a sweeping project—not just geographically but also politically—would be necessary that dealt with these problems all together with a series of measured links between security and boundaries, adjustment of the socio-economic inequities of the region, a guarantee for respect of the civil rights of the peoples. This was, in fact, De Michelis's idea borrowed from that conference for security in Europe which found its apex in the Helsinki Charter of 1975.

Things turned out differently. The war had a more clear-cut outcome than foreseen and postwar prospects are much clearer than one would have thought at the outset. There are opportunities that the victors intend to exploit immediately. There is the possibility of "separate peace" between Saudi Arabia and Syria on the one, hand and Israel on the other. In a parallel fashion, there is the possibility of confronting the Palestinian problem according to the outline of the "Baker Plan," an American-Palestinian negotiation that would later turn into an Israeli-Palestinian negotiation.

These are solutions that De Michelis often defined as "patches" that leave the fundamental problems unsolved. But they are capable of being followed up on immediately because the war's outcome left them that way. While the global solutions, such as the proposal of a conference, require long periods of time, they postulate an equivalent dignity between victors and vanquished which does not exist today. They also imply a very large negotiating table where the Europeans and the Soviet Union are also seated. Therefore, Egypt's Mubarak, who two months ago had espoused the Italian plan completely, now says it is premature. Syria's Assad, who feels he has become a giant with the defeat of his historic rival, Husayn, bluntly rejects it. Israel, which had shown interest, is ignoring it. And the United States, which tends to weigh its allies on the basis of the amount of blood spilled in the desert (the 'blood sharing,' pays more attention to the English, and even the French, than to the Italians, and are quite happy that the Soviet Union is staying on the margin of every negotiation.

#### **Precipitous Backing**

The foreign minister is also paying for mistakes not of his making. Prime Minister Andreotti's precipitous backing of the Gorbachev peace plan lowered Italy's value on the stock market of the allies of the White House. Even if yesterday, from Prague, Andreotti himself spoke of full agreement between Rome and Washington on the Middle East, his visit to the United States on 24 March confirms it.

Still, the proposal for a Middle Eastern conference cannot be considered as stillborn. Today it seems pretentious and precipitous. The European conference required a 30-year balance in order to create, on that



basis, the suppositions of its profound modifications (that were only realized 14 years later with the collapse of the Soviet empire). The Middle East is still searching for a balance; if and when it is consolidated, perhaps it will be possible to achieve an international conference that sanctions it politically and legally. And the Italian project could be recovered from the drawers where it has now been brutally enclosed. Because it is a plan for years, not for months, but now the winners are in a hurry.

## NETHERLANDS

### Stricter Technology Export Controls Sought

91EN0275A Rotterdam NRC *HANDELSBLAD*  
in Dutch 8 Feb 91 p 12

[Unattributed article: "The Chamber Wants Stricter Arms Export Regulations"]

[Text] The Hague, 8 February—The Second Chamber yesterday once again called for stricter European legislation to prevent the export of technologically high-quality weaponry. The Netherlands Government should strongly support such a move within the EC context. Current legislation on the European and national level is inadequate.

The Gulf war shows where this situation can lead. It is "sad" that the allied troops there must "fight against weapons that they themselves exported," said PVDA [Labor Party] member of parliament Valk. CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal] speaker Koffeman spoke in this regard of a "less than distinguished role by the Federal Republic [of Germany]." The CDA and PVDA wondered whether there should not be a nonproliferation treaty in order to counter the proliferation of missile technology.

All these points were brought up during a verbal consultation between Minister van den Broek and the Chamber Foreign Affairs Committee concerning the Fourth Review Conference on the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPV) Against the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, held in Geneva in August and September.

The Chamber seemed pessimistic about the results of this conference, which is held every five years. At the conference, the United States and Great Britain refused

to explicitly link further agreements on preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons to agreements on halting nuclear testing.

The attitude of the two major powers was criticized by all speakers. According to Koffeman (CDA), an extension of the NPV has been jeopardized. Valk (PVDA) said that the credibility of the West among Third World countries has decreased. Tommel (Democrats 66) criticized van den Broek, saying that the Netherlands is perhaps too understanding of the U.S. and British position.

"You can tell friends the truth, and the truth is that they are too sluggish," said Tommel. Van den Broek promised to urge both major powers "to consider this linkage seriously."

## TURKEY

### Spokesman Concerned Over Iraqi Use of CW

TA1303174691 Ankara *ANATOLIA* in Turkish  
1650 GMT 13 Mar 91

[Text] Ankara (ANATOLIA)—Pointing out that developments in Iraq are being followed carefully, Foreign Ministry Spokesman Murat Sungar said: We are worried about reports to the effect that the Iraqi leadership might resort to chemical weapons [CW].

In response to a question on reported uprisings in Iraq, Sungar said: We are closely following reports about armed clashes between troops loyal to the central government and certain opposing groups in Iraq, a war-torn country. We do not desire for the Iraqi people, for whom we have the best of feelings, to be involved in new sufferings even before the wounds of the war are healed. We hope that the Iraqi leadership will not resort to unacceptable methods in a bid to prevent unrest in the country.

Within this framework, we are worried about reports to the effect that the Iraqi leadership might resort to chemical weapons to prevent domestic unrest.

Turkey is opposed to the use of chemical and biological weapons and supports all efforts being made by the international community for the banning of these weapons and the destruction of the existing stocks. It is our sincere hope, therefore, for common sense to prevail and for our worries not to be realized.

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